You can tell when the LAO is a pawn of the AOC when it endorses the train wreck that is the AOC essentially taking over supervision of trial court operations. Who is going to supervise the AOC? It won’t be the Judicial Council as they’ve demonstrated they’re just road kill on the highway to the AOC’s objectives.
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Executive Summary
Historically, counties had the primary responsibility for (1) funding the trial courts, (2) constructing and maintaining court facilities, and (3) employing most court employees. However, beginning in 1997, the Legislature adopted a series of statutory changes that shifted or realigned each of these responsibilities from the counties to the state. In enacting these changes, the Legislature sought to create a trial court system that was more uniform in terms of standards, procedures, and performance standards. The Legislature also wanted to maintain a more efficient trial court system through the implementation of cost management and control systems.
In this report, we review the realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state and assess whether the goals the Legislature set for it have been achieved. In general, our analysis indicates that a number of existing barriers have prevented the trial court realignment from fully achieving the expressed goals and objectives of the Legislature.
By giving individual courts complete control over all employee–related issues, we find that enacted legislation did not go far enough in providing the state sufficient control and oversight over these significant costs. For example, the state and individual trial courts lack complete control over the retirement and health benefits being provided to some court workers, and there are indications that trial courts have not effectively bargained costs in their negotiations with trial court employees.
While other states have implemented comprehensive programs to assess the performance of their trial courts, such as a nationally developed set of assessment measures called CourTools, California’s efforts have been limited primarily to a few pilot programs. As a result, there is no comprehensive set of measures for which data is collected on a statewide basis in California and what data is collected is seldom used to hold trial courts accountable.
Based upon our analysis, it is also apparent that the implementation of realignment to date has not ensured an efficient division of responsibilities between the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and individual trial courts to advance the primary goals of the trial court realignment. No analysis has been done to assess whether the current division of responsibilities between the AOC and individual trial courts is cost–efficient, with the result that the state may be missing opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies in trial court operations.
In order to assist the Legislature in eliminating these barriers, we have identified significant opportunities for the state to exercise a greater role in the court system that would help advance the intended goals of realignment. For example, we recommend that the state assume true operational control over many aspects of trial court operations for which it already has financial responsibility, such as trial court employee classifications and benefits. Our proposals would also ensure that a comprehensive trial court performance assessment system is put in place and that there is a more efficient division of responsibilities between AOC and the trial courts. In our view, these changes would complete the original realignment plan begun by the Legislature and achieve improved performance and outcomes for the courts and state taxpayers.
Introduction
Currently, the state maintains 58 trial court systems, each having jurisdiction over a single county. These courts have trial jurisdiction over all criminal cases (including felonies, misdemeanors, and traffic matters). They also have jurisdiction over all civil cases (including family law, probate, juvenile, and general civil matters). In 2008–09, more than ten million cases were filed in trial courts throughout the state. Historically, counties had the primary responsibility for (1) funding trial courts, (2) constructing and maintaining court facilities, and (3) employing most court employees. However, beginning in 1997, the Legislature adopted a series of statutory changes that shifted or realigned each of these responsibilities from the counties to the state.
In this report, we review the realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state (including whether the objectives and goals the Legislature set have been achieved) and present recommendations for building upon this realignment to achieve improved outcomes for the trial courts. In preparing this report, we met with judges and administrative staff from different trial courts throughout the state, as well as individuals who were involved in the structuring and implementation of the realignment (such as former members of the Legislature), in order to gain an in–depth understanding on the extent to which the goals of realignment have been met. We also met with numerous representatives from the AOC and analyzed data that they provided to us.
Background
What Are Trial Courts?
Under the California Constitution, the state’s judicial system is comprised of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal, and the trial courts. Generally, judicial proceedings begin in the trial courts and are subsequently heard by the Courts of Appeal or the Supreme Court only if the decision made at the trial court level is appealed.
Prior to 1994, the state maintained three different types of trial courts—municipal, justice, and superior courts. Municipal and justice courts—which were also referred to as “inferior courts”—had jurisdiction over limited types of cases. These courts generally had jurisdiction over misdemeanors and infractions and most civil lawsuits involving disputes of $25,000 or less. Decisions made in these particular types of courts could be appealed to superior courts. With the passage of Proposition 191, a state constitutional amendment approved by the voters in 1994, justice courts were merged into municipal courts. Subsequently, in 1998, Proposition 220, a further constitutional change approved by California voters, authorized the merger of municipal courts with superior courts if a majority of judges in each court within a county voted for such unification. By 2001, all municipal courts were unified with their respective superior courts. As a result, the existing trial courts in each county are often referred to as superior courts.
Realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state has not changed their basic organization. Below, we describe some of the key entities in the trial court system and their responsibilities.
- Trial Court Judges. Trial court judges are primarily responsible for the day–to–day operations of trial courts, including the adoption of local court rules. Such rules typically cover a wide range of issues—from how cases are managed to how presiding judges are selected. The presiding judge of each trial court is responsible for leading the court by overseeing the assignment of cases, managing its budget, and establishing various trial court policies and procedures.
- Court Executive Officers. Court executive officers, who are selected based on procedures adopted by each trial court, generally carry out and oversee much of the non–judicial administrative and operational duties of the trial courts (such as human resources, budgeting and accounting, and managing the flow of cases through the court system).
- Judicial Council. The Judicial Council—which is primarily made up of judges—consists of 21 voting members and, currently, 10 advisory members. The council is responsible for making statewide rules for trial courts and recommendations to the Governor and Legislature for improving court operations. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court serves as chair of the Judicial Council. Following realignment, the council became responsible for court facilities and the allocation of funds to trial courts.
- AOC. The AOC is responsible for carrying out the administrative responsibilities of the Judicial Council. For example, AOC staff helps develop the budget requests for the statewide trial court system and oversee the construction of trial court facilities. In addition, AOC provides various services to the courts, including financial, human resources, and legal support. The Director of AOC is appointed by the Judicial Council.
- Legislature and Governor. The Legislature and the Governor are responsible for enacting statutes that establish judgeships—with the Governor responsible for filling judicial vacancies—and making budgetary decisions regarding the overall funding level for the trial courts. In addition, the court rules adopted by the Judicial Council must comply with state law, which often specify how trial courts shall operate.
What Is Realignment?
Several times over the last 20 years, the Legislature has sought to achieve notable policy improvements by reviewing state–local program responsibilities and taking action to realign or shift program and funding responsibility to the level of government likely to achieve the best outcomes. For example, in 1991, the Legislature shifted state mental health responsibilities to counties, giving counties a reliable funding stream and the authority to develop innovative and less costly approaches to providing services. More recently, as part of the 2011–12 budget, the Legislature shifted responsibility for low–level offenders, parole violators, and parolees from the state to counties. This realignment package also provided funding for the provision of court security directly to local sheriff’s offices rather than being appropriated in the annual state budget to the trial courts. While the implementation of realignment proposals has been complex, the net result of some of these changes is that California state and local governments have improved their ability to implement programs successfully. Below, we discuss how the Legislature realigned various responsibilities related to the trial courts from counties to the state.
Realignment of the Trial Courts
For many years, trial courts were essentially county entities. Counties were primarily responsible for financing the operations of the trial courts and counties employed nearly all individuals working in the trial courts. As such, individuals working in trial courts were classified as county rather than state employees, meaning that counties were responsible for all aspects of each court’s personnel system, including establishing employment policies and carrying out collective bargaining with individuals working in the courts. In addition, counties built, owned, and maintained trial court facilities. However, in 1997, the state began taking significant steps towards shifting some responsibilities for the trial courts from counties to the state. The three major pieces of legislation that authorized the realignment of responsibility for the trial courts to the state are summarized in Figure 1 and discussed in the sections that follow.
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Figure 1 Major Trial Court Realignment Legislation
State Assumes Primary Responsibility for Funding Trial CourtsIn 1997, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Chapter 850, Statutes of 1997 (AB 233, Escutia and Pringle), commonly referred to as the Lockyer–Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997. This measure implemented the Legislature’s goal of shifting primary responsibility for trial court funding from the counties to the state. Under the measure, individual trial court budgets would no longer depend on fiscal decisions made by the counties. Specifically, the measure had these features:
Main Goals: Stabilization and Simplification of Trial Court Funding. Chapter 850 was intended mainly to provide a mechanism that would ensure adequate funding levels for trial courts and thereby ensure equal access to justice across the state. During the years preceding its enactment, some trial courts had been on the verge of closing or laying off employees due to a lack of financial resources. For example, in 1995–96 and 1996–97 the Legislature provided supplemental funding to prevent the closure of some trial courts. The Legislature declared in Chapter 850 that the funding of trial court operations should be a state function because “such funding is necessary to provide uniform standards and procedures, economies of scale, and structural efficiency and simplification.” The Legislature said funding these courts was primarily the state’s responsibility because “the overwhelming business of the trial courts is to interpret and enforce provisions of state law and to resolve disputes among the people of the State of California.” Another stated goal of realigning trial court funding from the counties to the state was to simplify the “bifurcated funding structure” that observers contended overly complicated financial planning for the courts. The trial court for each county previously had to participate in both that county’s budget process as well as the state budget process. This made budgetary planning more difficult—particularly in counties that operated on a different fiscal year than the state. Chapter 850 removed trial courts from county budget deliberations as funding for these courts primarily became the state’s responsibility. Other Goals: Greater Efficiencies and Uniformity in Trial Court Operations. In adopting Chapter 850, the Legislature also outlined other goals it hoped to achieve from the state’s assumption of funding responsibility for the trial courts. These stated goals included:
While Chapter 850 increased the state’s responsibility for the funding of trial courts, it maintained individual trial courts’ primary responsibility for their day–to–day operations (such as funding allocations, processing of cases, trial court management, and hiring of personnel). Subsequent Legislative Action Authorized Automated Funding Increases for Trial Courts. Following the enactment of Chapter 850, trial courts submitted individual budget requests to the Judicial Council. Those requests approved by the Judicial Council were consolidated into budget change proposals that were then submitted to the Department of Finance (DOF). Upon approval by DOF, the requests were presented to the Legislature as part of the Governor’s annual budget proposal. However, the above process was replaced beginning in 2005–06 with the enactment of legislation authorizing an automated annual increase in trial court funding based on the State Appropriations Limit (SAL) growth factor—rather than based on annual budget requests reviewed and approved by the Legislature. (Please see the nearby box for a more detailed discussion of the SAL adjustment.) As a result, a portion of the total trial court budget was increased each year by a percentage equal to the SAL growth rate. Under this revised funding process, the Judicial Council allocated most of the additional funding provided by the SAL adjustment to individual trial courts based on their share of the total trial court budget. Some of the SAL funding, however, was allocated to those courts that were identified as “under–resourced” based on a methodology developed by AOC that compared the amount of personnel a court would need to address the cases filed at the court with the court’s resources for hiring these personnel.
From 2005–06 through 2007–08, additional funding was provided to the trial courts in the annual state budget based on the SAL adjustment. However, due to the state’s dire fiscal condition, SAL–adjusted funding has not been provided in each of the past three years. Legislation enacted as part of the 2009–10 budget package eliminated the automatic application of various cost–of–living increases—including the SAL adjustment for the trial courts. State Establishes Trial Court Employee Personnel SystemAnother significant part of the realignment of trial courts to the state was the enactment of Chapter 1010, Statutes of 2000 (SB 2140, Burton), commonly referred to as the Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, individuals working in trial courts were considered county employees. As discussed above, this is because the counties were responsible for all employee issues (such as the determination of retirement benefits and labor relations). As required by Chapter 850, the Task Force on Trial Court Employees reviewed and made recommendations as to whether trial court workers should remain county employees, become regular state employees, or maintain some other employee status. The Task Force recommended that these workers become “trial court employees” managed by individual trial courts. Chapter 1010 largely implemented this and other recommendations of the Task Force. As a result, the courts made these specific changes:
Main Goals: Clarification of Employee Status, Local Control, and Maintenance of Existing Compensation. In adopting Chapter 1010, the Legislature sought to clarify the status of individuals working in the trial courts. This is because after the state took over primary responsibility for funding trial courts, there was confusion among the courts and counties as to whether individuals working in the trial courts were still classified as county employees. In addition, the legislation sought to ensure that trial courts had local control over their day–to–day operations, which it did by giving virtually all employee–related responsibilities to individual trial courts. Finally, Chapter 1010 aimed to protect and maintain—to the extent possible—the pay and benefits that court employees were receiving from the counties in order to minimize disruption. State Assumes Responsibility of Trial Court FacilitiesAlthough the state assumed responsibility for funding the operations of trial courts in 1997, the state did not begin to take over the responsibility for and ownership of trial court facilities from counties until 2002 with the enactment of Chapter 1082, Statutes of 2002 (SB 1732, Escutia). This legislation, commonly referred to as the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002, sought to implement the recommendations of the Task Force on Court Facilities to transition facilities from county to state control. In contrast to the Legislature’s decision to decentralize control of court employees to individual trial courts, Chapter 1082 realigned responsibility for facilities to a statewide entity, the Judicial Council. The legislation had these key components:
Main Goal: Ensure More Efficient Operation of Court Facilities. In adopting the Trial Court Facilities Act, the stated intent of the Legislature was to ensure the entity responsible for using trial court facilities and determining the amount and type of space needed—the state—would also be responsible for building and maintaining the facilities. Specifically, the Legislature concluded that “uniting responsibility for operations and facilities increases the likelihood that operational costs will be considered when facility decisions are made, and enhances the economical, efficient, and effective court operations.” Expanded Role of Judicial Council and AOCAs indicated above, the various pieces of realignment legislation required the Judicial Council, through the AOC, to take on budgetary, administrative, and facility–related duties for the trial courts. For example, the Judicial Council became responsible for allocating funds to each trial court. In addition, AOC took on the duty of providing certain fiscal management, human resources, and building–related services to various courts. As a result of the expanded role of AOC, the budget of the Judicial Counscil has significantly increased since trial court realignment. As shown in Figure 2, the Judicial Council’s budget has quadrupled from $77 million in 1997–98 to $362 million in 2010–11. Similarly, the number of positions in AOC has more than tripled from 244 in 1997–98 to 960 in 2010–11.  Realignment Goals Not Yet Fully AchievedAs discussed above, the Legislature had some important goals in mind when it realigned trial courts to the state. For example, the Legislature sought to create a trial court system that was more uniform in terms of standards, procedures, and access to justice. The Legislature also wanted to maintain a more efficient court system through the implementation of cost management and control systems, and budget procedures and performance standards. Based on our review, we find that the package of legislation approved by the Legislature to shift most aspects of the trial court system to the state was a step in the right direction towards meeting these goals. However, by giving individual courts complete control over all employee–related issues, we find that enacted legislation did not go far enough in providing the state sufficient control and oversight, as well as ensuring greater coordination between AOC and individual trial courts, to advance the primary goals of the trial court realignment. Thus, as we discuss below, the realignment of the trial courts to the state has been incomplete. We outline these concerns below. Lack of State Control Over Trial Court Employee Personnel SystemGiven that the trial courts are now the financial responsibility of the state, it is essential that the state have sufficient control over the operations of the trial courts to also effectively control their costs. However, the realignment legislation gave control over most employee issues to individual trial courts. Thus, there is currently an inherent conflict in the existing structure and governance of the state trial court system in that the state has full responsibility for paying employee–related costs but does not have full control over these costs. This is particularly problematic in that effective management of personnel is fundamental to the sound and efficient operation of the trial court system, a key goal of the realignment. As discussed above, individual trial courts—rather than the state—are deemed to be the employer of most of the individuals who work in the trial courts. Accordingly, the salaries and benefits for trial court employees are determined as a result of separate and independent negotiations between individual trial courts (primarily trial court judges and court executive officers) and local labor organizations, rather than through state negotiations with a statewide entity such as the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA). In addition, unlike memoranda of understanding negotiated with state employee bargaining groups, agreements negotiated with trial court employees are not subject to ratification by the Legislature. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this report, trial court employees have continued to participate in individual county retirement benefit programs and—to a certain extent—county health benefit programs (including health insurance, dental insurance, and long–term disability). As a result, both the state and individual trial courts lack complete control over the level of these benefits provided to trial court employees and, more importantly, the costs that must be paid to provide those benefits. For example, trial courts are unable to change some of the terms of county–controlled benefit plans in their negotiations with labor organizations. In addition, our preliminary analysis suggests that trial courts may not have effectively contained costs in their negotiations with trial court employees. For example, the average salary of trial court employees increased about 55 percent from 2001–02 to 2010–11 (from about $40,000 to $62, 000), according to the most recent data available. In contrast, the average salaries of both executive branch employees and state judicial employees have increased by about half that rate. Moreover, although existing state law authorizes trial courts to negotiate the level of retirement contributions paid by their employees, only 31 of the 58 trial courts require any of their employees to make such contributions. In contrast, executive branch employees are generally required to contribute 8 percent to 10 percent of their salary towards these costs. Inadequate State Oversight Over Trial Court PerformanceAs noted above, the Legislature’s stated goals of the realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state included both an increase in the efficiency of the court system and improved access to the courts for Californians. In order to ensure programs operate in the most effective manner, however, it is critical that the level of government responsible for a particular program exercise sufficient oversight to ensure accountability for achieving good outcomes. An effective way to exercise such oversight is through the implementation of performance assessment programs. For example, both Utah and Massachusetts have implemented comprehensive trial court performance assessment programs based on a program developed by the National Center for State Courts, known as CourTools. The CourTools program measures court performance in ten different areas such as satisfaction of stakeholders and a court’s ability to carry out various tasks. (Please see box below for additional information about the CourTools program.)
Although California’s AOC endorsed the use of CourTools years ago, comprehensive performance measurement and assessment as envisioned in the trial court realignment legislation has been implemented in California’s trial courts only on a very limited basis. For example, since the realignment of the trial courts to the state, the CourTools program was piloted in four trial courts on a limited–term basis, and implemented to a certain extent in a few other courts. In addition, the AOC has initiated some efforts (not involving CourTools) to collect statewide information related to certain measures of trial court performance, such as the time it takes a court to process its caseload. Although these various efforts are a step in the right direction of meeting the realignment goals of increased efficiency and improved access, they have two primary shortcomings.
Little to Suggest Responsibilities Are Efficiently Divided Between AOC and the Trial CourtsAs previously mentioned, one of the goals of trial court realignment was to ensure structural efficiency and simplification by having a more unified court system. Prior to the realignment of the trial courts to the state, many of the services that courts rely on for their daily operations (such as human resource management and janitorial services) were generally carried out by county employees on behalf of each individual court. Staff in AOC’s headquarters office usually were not involved in such matters. Following the enactment of the realignment legislation, each court was allowed to decide whether it would continue to be responsible for a given service or if it would rely on AOC for that service. As a result, the assignment of these responsibilities was not done in a systematic way across all courts to ensure maximum efficiency. For example, while seven courts rely on AOC to process payroll, the other 51 counties either contract with a private provider or contract with their respective counties for such payroll services. At this time, no analysis has been done to assess whether the current division of responsibilities is cost–efficient. Thus, it is not known if the state is missing opportunities for achieving greater efficiencies in trial court operations. For example, to the extent that AOC is able to provide certain services at lower cost on a statewide basis due to economies of scale, trial courts that fail to take advantage of their services are not as efficient as they would otherwise be. Conversely, in certain cases, it may be more effective and efficient for individual courts to provide a certain service, rather than AOC. However, without additional information, the state does not have the ability to identify opportunities for greater efficiencies. Recommendations to Enhance and Complete the Realignment of the Trial CourtsIn this report, we have reviewed the realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state and identified a number of existing barriers that have prevented it from fully achieving the expressed goals and objectives of the Legislature. Based on our review and findings, we have identified significant opportunities for the state to exercise a greater role in the court system that would help advance the intended goals of realignment. While our recommendations, which are summarized in Figure 3 and discussed in detail below, generally provide for a greater state role in the trial court system, individual trial courts would continue to maintain control over many of the day–to–day operations (such as processing of cases and hiring of employees). Thus, they would operate similarly to other state agencies and would retain the independence envisioned in the realignment legislation. Figure 3 LAO Recommendations to Enhance and Complete Trial Court Realignment
Shift Responsibility for Trial Court Employee Personnel System to the StateAs previously mentioned, one key aspect of realignment remains problematic—the state’s lack of sufficient authority over the personnel who are the key to the efficient and effective operation of the trial court system. Accordingly, we recommend that the Legislature adopt legislation to realign full responsibility for the trial court employment system to the state—similar to the way the Legislature shifted the full responsibility of trial court facilities to the state. Under our proposal, Judicial Council, with the assistance of AOC, would assume essentially the same types of responsibilities for trial court employees that the Governor, DPA, and the State Personnel Board (SPB) carry out for state employees in the executive branch. (While SPB’s responsibilities include administering civil service examinations, establishing job classifications, and disciplinary policies, DPA is generally responsible for all other personnel management functions, such as collective bargaining.) For example, the Judicial Council would be responsible for creating a uniform employee classification system and for determining the number and type of employees who would perform duties at each trial court. (We note that under our approach, individual trial courts would retain authority over which individuals they would hire or promote to these positions.) In addition, the Judicial Council would be responsible for proposing uniform, statutory personnel rules for the Legislature to adopt for all trial courts (such as rules governing the procedures for employee discipline, and whether seniority would be taken into account in any future lay–off decisions). They would also be responsible for transitioning all trial court employees from county–administered benefits systems to one that is administered by the state in order to give the state full control over employee benefits. In addition, the Judicial Council (in consultation with representatives of the trial courts) would be responsible for negotiating with trial court employee unions, which would need to be reorganized to represent employees within the newly developed statewide employee classification system. Although these negotiations would create additional workload for AOC, we note that AOC currently maintains a staff of several professional labor negotiators that provide assistance to individual courts when requested. Additional labor negotiators could be hired at AOC with some of the savings derived from funds currently spent by individual trial courts on labor negotiations. As with other state collective bargaining agreements, under our proposed approach any labor agreements negotiated with trial court employees would need to be ratified by the Legislature. The benefits from these changes could be significant. Our proposed shift of the employee personnel system from individual trial courts to the Judicial Council would give the state needed control over employee issues and would further advance the Legislature’s ability to achieve the expressed realignment goal of greater uniformity in the operation of the trial court system. For instance, requiring the Judicial Council to be responsible for collective bargaining would ensure that such negotiations take statewide fiscal concerns into full account. It would reduce the number of separate labor negotiations that were conducted, which could also result in budgetary savings. In addition, the establishment of uniform personnel rules and standards would help create the structural efficiency and simplification envisioned in the trial court realignment legislation. Our proposed approach of vesting control over the personnel system with the Judicial Council, rather than assigning these duties to an executive branch agency such as DPA, would appropriately protect the state constitutional independence and authority of the judicial branch. Establish a Comprehensive Trial Court Performance Assessment ProgramRecent efforts by California’s courts have fallen short in fulfilling the goals of realignment pertaining to the use of performance measures. For example, there is currently no comprehensive set of measurements for which data is collected on a statewide basis regarding trial court operations. Consequently, we recommend that the Legislature take steps towards establishing a comprehensive performance assessment program for the trial courts, in order to allow the state to more effectively manage its trial court system. First, we recommend that the Legislature specify in statute the specific performance measurements it believes are most important and require the Judicial Council to collect data on each measurement from individual trial courts on an annual basis. In determining the specific performance measurements, we believe that it will first be important for the Legislature to solicit input from the Judicial Council. Thus, we recommend the Judicial Council report to the Legislature by a specified date—say, March 1, 2013—on its recommendations regarding appropriate measurements. In preparing this report, the Judicial Council should examine the measurements currently used by federal courts and other state courts. After the Legislature adopts specific performance measurements for the trial courts in statute, and after data on these measurements has been collected and reported by the Judicial Council for at least two years, we recommend that the Legislature establish a system for holding individual courts accountable for their performance relative to those standards. Such an accountability system would involve the establishment of (1) a specific benchmark that the courts would be expected to meet for each measurement and (2) steps that would be taken should the court fail to meet the benchmark over time (such as by requiring a court that fails meet a benchmark to adopt the practices of those courts that were successful in meeting the same performance benchmark). Establish a More Efficient Division of Responsibilities Between AOC and Trial CourtsAs indicated above, there is little evidence that the current division of responsibilities between AOC and the trial courts is efficient. This is because AOC does not collect information on the types of services that each trial court provides and how that compares to the services it provides to courts. Thus, we recommend that the Legislature adopt statutory changes that direct AOC to provide the Legislature with an inventory of the specific services that are provided by each trial court and those that it provides, including the cost of providing each service. The Judicial Council should then report its recommendations for assigning each service to the entity able to the deliver the service with the greatest efficiency. Such information would help the Legislature consider statutory changes to help clarify the responsibilities of AOC and the trial courts as well as any necessary budget adjustments to reflect these changes, which would likely result in budgetary savings. We find that efficiently dividing the roles and responsibilities of AOC and the trial courts will help achieve the economies of scale fromhaving a unified, state–run trial court system. ConclusionIn realigning the responsibility of the trial courts from the counties to the state, the Legislature sought to create a trial court system that would be more uniform in terms of standards, procedures, and access to justice. The Legislature also wanted to create a more efficient court system through the implementation ofcost management and control systems, budget procedures, and performance standards. However, our analysis indicates that a number of existing barriers have prevented the trial court realignment from fully achieving the expressed goals and objectives of the Legislature. In effect, critical components of the realignment of the trial courts from the counties to the state remain undone. Given the massive investment that the state has made in establishing a state–run trial court system, we believe that the Legislature should seek to eliminate these barriers and provide the state with greater control and responsibility over trial courts, rather than undo the realignment of the trial courts. As we have shown, there are important steps the Legislature could take to build upon its past efforts. For example, we recommend that the state assume true operational control over many critical aspects of trial court operations for which it already has financial responsibility, such as trial court employee classifications and benefits. Our proposals would also ensure that a comprehensive trial court performance assessment system is put in place and that there is a more efficient division of responsibilities between AOC and the trial courts.
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Statement released by the Alliance of California Judges this afternoon in response to this report.
If anyone has other organizational responses we wish to publish them. You’re invited to comment of course.
Statement by the Alliance of California Judges on the LAO report “Completing the Goals of Trial Court Realignment” (authored by Drew Soderberg)
CJA RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE REPORT “COMPLETING THE GOALS OF TRIAL COURT REALIGNMENT”
CJA is deeply concerned that the LAO’s Report released yesterday reflects a fundamental failure to understand and acknowledge that our democracy is based upon the existence of three co-equal and separate branches of government. The judicial branch is not merely a state department under the direction of the executive or legislative branch, nor can it be centralized in the same ways as other branches of government. Earlier this month, CJA held its Annual Conference which focused on how the judiciary can improve the governance of our branch, and the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council are in the midst of analyzing how the Administrative Office of the Courts can be better managed and better serve the needs of individual trial courts. In the midst of the judiciary’s engagement in this important process and debate over where improvement is needed in the current level of centralization, the LAO’s Report recommends the ultimate centralization of the administration of local courts, including salary and benefits. CJA is opposed to this complete centralization and encroachment upon the constitutional authority of local trial courts.
Judicial Council Watcher 
Judicial Council Watcher
September 28, 2011
Updated… Check back periodically as we imagine other parties will also comment similarly to the ACJ.
Just wondering
September 28, 2011
Be interested what response the “Voice of the Judiciary” (California Judges Association) makes.
Wendy Darling
September 28, 2011
Published today, Wednesday, September 28, from the Metropolitan News Enterprise, by Sherri Okamoto:
Judicial Branch Taps Private Fund for History Project Honoring Ex-Chief Justice George
By SHERRI M. OKAMOTO, Staff Writer
The judicial branch is contributing money from a fund financed by private donors to document the recollections and reminiscences of former Chief Justice Ronald M. George.
http://www.metnews.com/
Also published today, from The Recorder, the on-line publication of CalLaw, by Cheryl Miller:
Legislative Analyst Says Court Centralization Hasn’t Worked
Cheryl Miller
September 28, 2011
But the report, while faulting the AOC, says the solution may be giving it more power over trial court hiring and staffing.
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202517196659&Legislative_Analyst_Says_Court_Centralization_Hasnt_Worked&slreturn=1
Long live the ACJ.
antonatrail
September 28, 2011
We’re all fascinated with Al Capone too. Why not? Hells bells and man the life boats!
antonatrail
September 28, 2011
Holy crap and shit on a shingle! I’m watching the Titanic, The California judicial branch, sink into the ocean before my very eyes!
anna
September 29, 2011
what crap!!!!
anonymous
September 29, 2011
Having read a raft of analysis provided by Drew Soderberg over the years that generally endorses the AOC’s continued expansion and control, perhaps the legislature should re-assign Mr Soderberg away from being tasked with judicial branch analysis.
anonymous
September 29, 2011
It appears that the AOC could afford a hundred million dollar reallocation on their over-inflated budget that fuels all of these contractors, consultants and waste.
One Who Knows
September 29, 2011
I understand that Drew is leaving the judiciary assignment and will be working on prison issues instead.
Nathaniel Woodhull
September 29, 2011
Given the fact that the once Great State of California is already plummeting towards the depths of the Mariana Trench, does this really surprise anyone? Over the past 40 years, California has transitioned from the Golden State to the Molding State. It is consistently rated as the worst State to do business in. Since our State leaders have done such a great job driving the private sector out of the State, why not continue that process in the public sector.
Some of us have been trying to serve the public for decades. We have worked collaboratively with local justice partners and citizens to create innovative and highly cost-effective programs that have benefited those whom we serve. Despite our best efforts, the AOC and HRH-1 and HRH-2 have continuously done their best to throw roadblocks in the way at every turn over the past decade. State Trial Court Funding has seriously hampered our efforts to provide services to our community. It seems now that the LAO and others in Sacramento feel that the AOC should be given the opportunity to screw up local services to an even higher degree possible. As predicted, it seems that the JC/AOC are on the path to a complete takeover of local courts. Soon we will be told who are PJ’s are; they will select our CEO’s and even make judicial assignments. I understand that working in Mono County is lovely this time of year….
There are an increasing percentage of days in which I am not sure that anybody is listening to us; and if they are listening they simply do not care. More and more of my colleagues are starting to give up. Many are seriously talking about leaving California and doing so soon. Unless things show signs of a change, I am sorry to say that my colleagues may have the right idea.
Been There
September 29, 2011
Even if the LBO Report was not without serious flaws, I question the ability and “street cred” of the current CJ, the JC, and Mr. Overholt and his team to enact these proposals. This seems little more than an invitation to a replay of all the failures we have seen in the CCMS misadventure — the bloat in personnel at the AOC, failures in leadership, lack of competency, and cost overruns, which will all “trickle down” to the trial courts in even greater reductions in funding.
And these are not the best of times for the CJ, the JC, and “Team Overholt.” CCMS is not operational and consumes personnel and cash in seemingly unending numbers. Can “Team Overholt” continue CCMS and also find the personnel and resources to enact any of these proposals in a competent and cost efficient manner? I think not.
A complete house cleaning of the leadership of the JC and the AOC must be done. Perhaps the time has come for a group of concerned judicial officers and stakeholders in the courts to have some serious face time with a senior staffer in the Governor’s Office.
Wendy Darling
September 29, 2011
Published today, Thursday, September 29, from The Metropolitan News Enterprise, by Sherri Okamoto:
Trial Courts Need Tighter State Oversight—Legislative Analyst
By Sherri M. Okamoto, Staff Writer
The state should assert increased control over the operations of its 58 trial courts, the Legislative Analyst’s Office said yesterday.
The Legislature’s nonpartisan fiscal and policy advisor, in a 20-page report, expressed concern that the realignment of the trial courts under the fiscal control of the state “to date has not ensured an efficient division of responsibilities between the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and individual trial courts….”
Existing legislation on trial court governance, the LAO said, does not “go far enough in providing the state sufficient control and oversight,” and has not been successful in fully implementing the goals and objective of the Legislature for the realignment process.
http://www.metnews.com/
Long live the ACJ.
MrsKramer
September 29, 2011
“The LAO recommended that the Legislature ‘specify in statute the specific performance measurements it believes are most important and require the Judicial Council to collect data on each measurement from individual trial courts on an annual basis’ and later adopt a system for holding individual courts accountable for their performance relative to those standards.”
Accountable to whom and who sets the standards? My guess would be Evidence Based Practices (EBP) established by NCSC and their affiliate, incorporated, “non” profits.
Jon Wintermeyer
September 29, 2011
What a farce this action would be. I understood that the AOC wanted the Trial Court’s designated representatives to have the capacity to meet with their peers to give twice a year reviews on the AOC’s Facilities Maintenance Unit (FMU) and the third party contractors hired to perform that were assigned to that court. I took part in that program and the AOC and their unlicensed contractors were worse in quality and higher in costs than the County.
The AOC claimed the reason the trial court’s were dis-satisfied was they never got to review and report on the short comings of county run projects and they were giving that to the trial courts.
The AOC Management promised the trial courts service equal to or better than the county was providing and they never met that goal. The only projects performed in the CC Courts that were better in cost, quality and time required than the County were the ones done in-house under my control using my staff, some county trades and hired subcontractors. There are cost records that proved this fact.
The answer to that proof of the AOC FMU’s poor performance was to not allow me to represent the CC Court at the meetings and to instruct their puppet CEO to remove me ASAP. The other AOC units like Real Estate Asset and Management, Office of Court Construction and Management and Emergency Response and Security all knew what my value was to the CC Court. The Court staff and those not in fear of CEO Torre or PJ O’Malley knew what was accomplished and were never allowed voice in the actions taken by them.
Wendy Darling
September 29, 2011
Also published today, Thursday, September 29, from The Metropolitan News Enterprise:
Judges Cannot Be Disciplined for Authorizing Their Own Benefits, CJA Tells Attorney General
By a MetNews Staff Writer
http://www.metnews.com/
Long live the ACJ.
Judicial Council Watcher
September 29, 2011
The California Judges Association posted a response this afternoon. We’ve re-posted it at the bottom of our post, above.
Judicial Council Watcher
September 29, 2011
I wonder if AFSCME or SEIU will be weighing in…..Also, you might have noticed how quiet the JC/AOC is on this issue probably because they initiated this flawed analysis.
antonatrail
September 29, 2011
Courthouse News suing Ventura County Clerk over [lack of] access to newly filed unlimited civil litigation. Ventura County Clerk claims budget cuts are the problem.
Isn’t Ventura an early adopter court of CCMS? Could it be CCMS and the problems entering newly case files into the computer system the problem? Just wondering.
http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/09/29/40176.htm
Kevin Grimm
September 29, 2011
I’ve said it before but it bears repeating, y’all are delusional here in the JC Watcher echo chamber.
An even-handed analysis of the current problems by the LAO can only mean one thing: the analyst is a “pawn of the AOC.” The solution to the independent analysis by the Legislature? Form a legislative committee to conduct an independent analysis. (Rinse and repeat until you get the conclusions that fit your black-and-white vision of the world: “JC & AOC, bad; trial courts & local control, good”).
I’m disappointed also in CJA’s response asserting judicial independence. LAO is not recommending a take-over of the courts by another branch of government. They’re pointing to the insanity of however many hundreds of bargaining units exist across the 58 superior courts. Which leaves CJA in the odd position of asserting judicial independence of the trial courts from the judiciary’s own governance structure, the JC.
Union members in AFSME & SIU locals across the state should embrace the LAO’s recommendations. Take a look at how wildly different your salaries & benefits are across courts and weep. I know of some small courts that didn’t even offer retirement health benefits.
When Judge Woodhull claims that “State Trial Court Funding has seriously hampered our efforts to provide services to our community” he’s missing the point that you all miss here on planet JC Watcher. State trial court funding wasn’t about your community court. It was about our court; about the California courts. Many courts have benefitted immensely from state funding.
It’s hard not to view the Alliance and the JC Watcher as the revenge of the courts and judges who were doing fine under local control and would just as soon let the rest of the state rot.
Long live Asinine California Judges!
Nathaniel Woodhull
September 30, 2011
Mr. Grimm,
I am not a member of the ACJ, nor a member of the CJA since it has demonstrated since the era of Jim Mize and Terry B. Friedman that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the AOC.
I respectfully disagree with your assertion that I am “missing the point” regarding the purposes behind State Trial Court Funding. Since the enactment of Proposition 13 (yes some of us have been around much longer than that) many smaller counties had difficulty funding their courts in the last quarter of each fiscal year. The Lockyer-Isenberg Bill was designed to ensure that there would be a “stable” funding source for the trial courts. The idea being, that there would not be disparate funding in Modoc County versus Los Angeles County. On balance, most smaller counties have benefited from State Trial Court Funding and that is fine. In the case of other counties, including my own, we have not done as well. Despite that fact, I am still not opposed to the underlying concept of the Lockyer-Isenberg legislation.
What I have a problem with is the lack of democracy with respect to the administration of the judicial branch in California. During a business dinner meeting on November 9, 1992, shortly after the arrival of William Vickrey and with him serving as the “catalyst”, the Judicial Council announced they were going to embark on an “unprecedented endeavor of self-governance” over the Judicial Branch. The Council then announced that they were the “policy making” body for the courts. Despite this self-proclaimed role, the Judicial Council is not the policy making body for the third branch of government. The California Constitution expressly provides that the Council can recommend policy, the Judicial Council does not make policy for the trial courts. Ronald George’s back door efforts to amend Article VI fell flat on its face when it was exposed in 2006.
I believe of the judicial branch as the most important branch of our government, as it has the ability to off-set and balance the actions (and inactions) of the other two branches. Hopefully, this balancing ensures that our overall system of democracy works.
Our trial courts each democratically elect Presiding Judges based upon each candidates background, skills and abilities. The same cannot be said for the “management” at the state level. Lenin and Stalin would be amazed with our current totalitarian regime. While it is possible to remove members of the Supreme Court at the time of their retention elections, the general public does not have a hot-button issue as they once did with Bird/Grodin/Reynoso. I’m sure that 95% of the electorate is either unaware of or does not care about the issues we are discussing in this forum.
If the path to the Judicial Council were democratized, I’d bet about 80% of the postings here would evaporate. The lack of democracy, the self-dealing, and waste of precious fiscal resources are what most of us are here to protest against. Some of us have tried to work within the system to effect change over the years. The totalitarian control exercised by the two most recent Chief Justices have made it clear that no dissenting, or even questioning views need apply for any positions within the administration’s hierarchy. These are not the democratic principles upon which our system of government was founded. I for one, will continue to fight against what I can only define as fascism.
JusticeCalifornia
September 30, 2011
Very well said.
Been There
September 29, 2011
Yes, Kevin, the salaries are different in the courts, but it is more related to the vastly different cost of living in different areas of the state.
The disadvantage of a state-wide salary schedule is that a living wage in Plumas County is not necessarily a living wage in San Francisco. This disparity is felt most harshly by the lowest paid court workers. The courts in higher cost of living areas suffer too if their salary schedule is not competitive because of problems in recruiting and retention. As a former court manager I strongly support local courts establishing their own classification and compensation systems.
courtflea
September 29, 2011
Mono and Modoc county are beautiful this time of year, if you are interested in travel info 🙂
versal-versal
September 29, 2011
Mr Grimm – running a court system is all about balance. Woodhull is absolutely correct as the rise of the AOC and JC has adversely effected the ability of the local trial courts to serve the public that elected their respective trial judges. For example any trial court could develop a highly effective case management system that conforms to the traditions and legal culture of that court at a fraction of the cost of CCMS. Advocates of the current insular and anti-democratic centralized run court system repeatedly fail to see this essential point, that judges are elected constitutional officers responsible to the citizens who elected them. The word balance is key to understanding what is currently failing. If we are to accept a state run court system for the postive reasons you set forth why can’t we democratize the JC to allow for a wide variety of viewpoints and opinions. Why should just 2 people ,J Huffman and or J Miller and the CJ select 95% of the JC membership to administer a court system the size of California? The result of such a closed system has ironically destroyed what the former CJ was seeking to accomplish-stable trial court funding. Finally Mr Grimm can you shed some light on this Administrative Justice Fund ? The fund is made up of gifts given to the AOC , which in turn uses those funds for dinners, travel and other perks for undisclosed individuals. Would you be kind enough to give us some insights into that ? If anyone else out there reading this blog knows about this fund and the manner in which it is used can you weigh in? Thanks
Been There
September 29, 2011
Courtflea thanks for the tip! I spent many a summer in Graeagle and loved it! I believe Mono County is a lovely drive down 395 from Plumas (?), and if so I believe you can come back to the Bay Area through Yosemite – at least during the summer months.
Wendy Darling
September 29, 2011
Published today, Thursday, September 29, from The Recorder, the on-line publication of CalLaw, by Cheryl Miller:
S.F. Eliminating Court-Provided Reporters in Most Civil Cases
Cheryl Miller
SACRAMENTO — Starting Monday, San Francisco Superior Court will no longer provide court reporters for matters heard in 16 civil courtrooms, the court announced Thursday.
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202517450738&SF_Eliminating_CourtProvided_Reporters_in_Most_Civil_Cases&slreturn=1
Long live the ACJ.
MrsKramer
September 30, 2011
Definately a distinct change in Mr. Walter’s writing indicative of a change in the wind. He has gone from a few “rebel” judges purportedly respresenting hundreds — to –there are a few hundred judges who have a valid point that an independent assessment of the problem is a good idea.
QUOTE: “The ACJ’s proposal to have ‘a select committee of the Legislature with an independent staff’ do the assessment makes a lot of sense.”
Kevin Grimm
September 29, 2011
Salary and benefits differentials across courts are way beyond anything that can be explained by differences in cost of living and state personnel systems are not uniform; they take into account these differences.
But this is just one small point that shouldn’t be over emphasized in the larger scheme of things. JCW and ACJ continue to claim that we live in a world of simple problems with simple solutions: get rid of the evil Judicial Council and AOC and all will be well.
If the independent LAO should happen to come out with a report which includes criticisms of aspects of decentralization and centralization it can only be explained by blaming the messenger: the LAO is the AOC’s “pawn.” It appears to be inconceivable to the followers of this site that the branch faces complex problems and that there may be elements of truth in the arguments of those who favor centralization as well as in those who favor decentralization.
It would be laughable if not for the real damange that the ACJ and JCW are doing to the branch.
Judicial Council Watcher
September 30, 2011
We’ve never advocated getting rid of the Judicial Council or the AOC. What we have advocated is democratizing the Judicial Council and firing the entire board of directors and assistant directors for the AOC.
Mr. Soderberg’s analysis over the past couple of years seriously call into question his own impartiality. Not on a partisan basis but on a pro-AOC basis.
Been There
September 29, 2011
Kevin, I guess we’ll just have to agree to disagree.
JusticeCalifornia
September 29, 2011
I understand and support the elimination of trial court waste, mismanagement and corruption as I have witnessed it up close and personal in Marin. But the Marin trial court waste, mismanagement and corruption could not have survived unless it was protected by top leadership– in ever so many ways that I personally witnessed– and documented.
The most formidable argument against giving the CJ/JC/AOC legislative credibility or more (rather than less) administrative/oversight management power is the increasingly well-documented track record of waste, mismanagement, and misrepresentations of that trio as a whole, and of so many individual members of top leadership. Our chief justice is a gambling barmaid (turned woefully inexperienced chief justice) who has bull**** top administrators and advisors. I would love to believe in her and top leadership, but my personal bull**** barometer is Kim Turner– our gambling barmaid’s current favorite Judicial Council suckup/ sidekick who knew about, concealed, and signed off on her former Marin court boss’s $650,000 transgressions at taxpayer expense, and collaborated with the AOC to destroy Marin child custody evidence in the middle of a legislative audit and ongoing child custody cases. If a gambling barmaid was the best and brightest choice for chief justice, and if Turner, Torre and Roddy are what our CA chief justices consider to be the best and brightest of judicial branch administrators, then I say– a) bring it on Jerry, let’s have the state take over the entire branch; but b) it is irresponsible and a patent betrayal of the public trust to knowingly and intentionally hand the keys of a $4 billion public trust over to a handpicked den of thieves.
I swear, you really couldn’t write a better reality show or sitcom than what is going down right now. The absurdity of it all would be fall on the floor hilarious if the implications and fallout were not as serious as a heart attack.
Wendy Darling
September 30, 2011
Published Friday, September 30, from The Sacramento Bee, by Dan Walters:
Judges’ War Gets New Ammo From Legislative Analyst
By Dan Walters
The Legislature’s budget analyst has waded into the political war between the state court system’s San Francisco-based leadership – including Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye – and hundreds of local trial court judges.
http://www.sacbee.com/2011/09/30/3949583/dan-walters-judges-war-gets-new.html
Long live the ACJ.
lando
September 30, 2011
Great analysis by the venerable Mr Walters. Maybe this legislative committee can also find out why the AOC is spending public money on helping recognize and record former CJ George’s recollections about his work . In this economic environment I would think that expenditure would be viewed as inappropriate particularly as trial courts around the state are laying off employees and reducing services to the public. The existence and management of this Administration of Justice fund raises many troubling issues including who used these funds for dinner and travel perks and were these gifts reported to state governmental entities. I also find it curious that many of the highest level AOC management employees reportedly contributed to this fund. Why for example would all of the “regional managers” contribute to a fund of this kind? The legislature really needs to ask the AOC to submit to a full expert forensic audit.
JusticeCalifornia
September 30, 2011
Actually the legislature should have the BSA do a comprehensive audit of the entire branch– top to bottom, and identify the issues throughout. That would be an excellent first step in crafting a thoughtful, responsible plan for the branch which would include the trial court independence promised in 1997.
By the way, an interesting word has surfaced– “realignment”.
I know it was recently used to saddle trial courts with more criminal cases–
but when has it been used in connection with the 1997 trial court funding issues? I never noticed it before.
Wendy Darling
September 30, 2011
Published today, Friday, September 30, from The Recorder, the on-line publication of CalLaw, by Cheryl Miller:
Court Reporters Now a Luxury Item in S.F., Other Civil Courts
Cheryl Miller
SACRAMENTO — For a growing number of California’s trial lawyers, a briefcase isn’t the only thing they need to bring to court any more.
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202517588879&Court_Reporters_Now_a_Luxury_Item_in_SF_Other_Civil_Courts
Long live the ACJ.
JusticeCalifornia
September 30, 2011
As a seasoned litigator, I can unequivocally state that professional court reporters provide an invaluable service to litigants and their lawyers. And ALL seasoned lawyers–(say hey Dunn, Steinberg, Corbett, and Feuer) including those on their knees sucking up to top leadership– know this.
Courts and the public require the basics– a courtroom; an ethical, unbiased judge; a good court clerk; and a professional court reporter. Wow– so simple, but don’t we all wish we just automatically had that?
The branch, in first and foremost eliminating court reporters in the name of “budget concerns”, is carefully and systematically ridding itself of live, professional, official witnesses/scriveners of branch conduct. . . .and misconduct.
Dunn, Steinberg, Feuer, and Corbett, if you give your attorney/leadership seal of approval to this, you are selling out the bar and the public. You know better. Court regulated ER (and convenient alleged technical difficulties related thereto) is better than nothing, but it is no substitute for live professional court reporters.
JusticeCalifornia
September 30, 2011
Call me cynical but the sudden use of the our Governor’s buzzword “realignment” in connection with trial court funding and [mis]management issues smacks of a savvy marketing ploy dreamt up by our gambling barmaid’s PR people, and perhaps her legislative negotiators (Joe? Darrell? Ellen? Mike? As in, hey Tani, here is how to pitch your grab for power to the Governor and legislature. . . .)
No matter. Sometimes opportunities come in unexpected packages. I expect that even or perhaps especially lawyer/public servants Joe, Darrell, Ellen and Mike– who have all seen the down and dirtiest there is to see in the branch–understand that the rules of the game have changed. Awareness of and interest in branch misconduct is increasing exponentially, and will continue to do so. Hey, history is in the making. The actions and inactions of everyone involved in the rather amazing current evolution of the branch are being memorialized real time. Knowledge is power, and at the moment what makes the most sense is a BSA TOP TO BOTTOM audit of the judicial branch, with solicited input from all stakeholders, so all three branches — and the public they serve, and that pays them–can make informed decisions.
Long live democracy.
Kevin Grimm
September 30, 2011
I suspect this will degenerate into a squabble over legal interpetation, but here’s the CA Constitution, Article VI, Section 6:
“(d) To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, and perform other functions prescribed by statute. The rules adopted shall not be inconsistent with statute.”
I don’t expect everyone (probably not anyone on the JC Watcher site) to agree with my interpretation of this. But could someone at least admit that there’s a lot of room in there for the council to act? Call it “policy” or call it something else, the Constitution seems to give the council broad powers.
And, btw, it doesn’t give those powers democratically. It doesn’t say everybody gets a vote. It says that the chief gets to decide.
We all of us seem to pick and choose those parts of the system that we think need to be democratic, but there are always limits. I’m guessing that ACJ isn’t advocating the popular election of judges. That’s the weird part about our democracy: it’s not democratic everywhere, probably least so in the judiciary.
JusticeCalifornia
September 30, 2011
lol Kevin.
Tell me who, in your considered opinion, has a) ultimate oversight of, and b) criminal jurisdiction over the concerted actions of the CJ/JC/AOC?
I do expect a reasoned answer.
One Who Knows
September 30, 2011
Grimm – an important provision is that those rules can not be inconsistent with the statute. So while there may be some discretion, it is not broad because those rules must be consistent with what the Legislature adopts. The discretion is only broad if the Legislature allows it. The real discretion and primary authority is with the Legislature and not the Judicial Council. This is too often forgotten.
MrsKramer
September 30, 2011
Kevin, there is alot of room in there for the council to act. The crux of the problem seems to be how the council is chosen. There too much group think going on with only those who think the same being continually on the council. Not all. Most. Better guidelines need to be established of how council members are selected and how long they may serve…seems to me.
lando
October 1, 2011
Mr Grimm- i am shocked you didn’t know we have the “popular election” of judges every 2 years.You can’t really believe that one person , the CJ should select the full membership of the JC. Not after the train wreck that has ensued. By the way I was looking at my very nice and probably expensive 2007 edition of he AOC’s “Innovations” in the California Courts. It is a fascinating read including the two pages on CCMS.The first sentence in this incredible 2 page description says it all- “The California Case Management System(CCMS) , one of the largest and most visible projects in an overall drive to standardize court practices and procedures, is the state wide technology initiative to implement a uniform application to manage all case categories”.Sounds like the first piece of the then planned takeover of the trial courts. Unfortunately CJ George’s other prongs of the plan, the trailer bill to allow the JC/AOC to pick PJ’s and CEO’s and the expansion of Article 6 giving the CJ and JC even more power failed so that the “overall drive” to take everything over stalled and now looks like a plan in ruins thanks to the cost overruns of CCMS . By the way according to this “Innovations” publication “CCMS will be fully implemented in all 58 superior courts by the end of 2012. “I guess the AOC was just being conservative as we now know per Justice Bruinears that CCMS is fully deployed as of March no I mean September of 2011 . You really can’t make this stuff up.
Been There
October 1, 2011
Lando,
Can you please clarify for me the method you propose for election of JC members? I acknowledge that the present method of the CJ appointing “the usual suspects” over and over again is fatally flawed.
Direct public election presumes an electorate that is informed about all the candidates and the issues, and not just the candidates at the top of a statewide ballot. What method would be offered to ensure that the elected JC would include judicial officers representative of all areas of the state, representing both large and small counties?
Thank you.
Judicial Council Watcher
October 1, 2011
The lack of any more specific proposals is something that no one has cause to rally around. While we all agree that the system should represent the interests of the trial courts and the rest of the judicial system in a more democratic manner, we are pointing to a problem without a specific solution.
Promoting a solution is what is required to move change forward. We would strongly urge either the CJA or ACJ to outline specific solutions or face getting run over by the legislature wanting to complete the goals of realignment based on the AOC’s myopic view.
If this isn’t already obvious, keep this in mind: The legislature will be addressing this one way or another and Mr. Soderberg has submitted the AOC/JC recommendation in his latest analysis. Perhaps this is what Bonnie Lowenthal meant about “you don’t want the legislature to do it to you”.
JusticeCalifornia
October 1, 2011
JCW I agree.
Opportunity has knocked, and the door is open for change. The legislature and the governor clearly have to do something about what is going down in the branch.
It is up to those desiring change to walk through the open door. NOW. If they have the ideas, but not the time or manpower, they should retain those who know what they are doing to walk through the legislative doors and get the word out to the public.
Gwysen Samson
October 1, 2011
Oh please Lando, popular election of judges every two years?
I have silently been watching this site for months but I have to speak on this one. I’m shocked you don’t know that a vast majority of judges get on their knees every election cycle and pray no one runs against them and when someone does, they and their fellow jurists circle the wagons and protect one another. Even the bad judges are protected because if one falls they are all vulnerable. Any attorney worth his or her salt knows not to run against a sitting judge because life will be miserable for them if they win or lose. Judges love to say they are independently elected but in reality, they get appointed and try to stay off the ballot for dear life.
courtflea
October 1, 2011
Gwysen Samson, what you suggest may be true, however, it still is a popular election and to blame is voter apathy and chicken s**t attorneys who are afraid to run that leads to the senario you describe. I mean if they really want to make a change in the process they have to exercise some bravery right? surely you have seen example set by the ACJ.
Perhaps I am way out there, but maybe this whole realignment thing is a red herring ala this: a friend of the AOC in the LAO proposes this senario in order to deflect the legislatures interest in the goings on of the AOC. And come on Mr. Grimm, all sides in this debate have friends in high places in SACTO, so get real. But either way, who does what the LAO recommends anyway?
While I hear the arguements out there, the issue is NOT a statewide equal compensation and benefits for employees (such as federal court employees have) with pay differentials in areas where the cost of living is higher, which I am sure most of you all would support and the unions would as well (and take care of Mr. Grimm’s concerns) , it is wheather or not the AOC has the authority or ability to make employees of the trial courts accountable to them, not the local trial courts. I am confident that would be the last thing the unions would want and there would be major lawsuits to stop any such action.
Judicial Council Watcher
October 2, 2011
Not to mention that it would be difficult to achieve without also granting AOC employees bargaining rights – or doing away with bargaining rights in the trial courts.
unionman575
October 2, 2011
Bargaining rights are the only thing standing between us and a total free for all with trial court management.
courtflea
October 2, 2011
yep guys this would not be an easy thing for the AOC to pull off. Thank God for a legal system that does not allow tyrany over employees or employers. Now lets get that extended to the JC and the CJ. Long live the ACJ.
lando
October 2, 2011
Hi Been There- While I am not a fan of the CJA since Judge Mize and former Judge Freidman helped make it a wholly owned subsidiary of the JC/AOC, the way they elect their executive board may be a way to develop a system that properly weights courts of all sizes in a balance that would be fair. The Judges in each district would elect their representatives. Given a system like that, the JC could end up like it is now but at least judges would be able to have the opportunity to elect a more diverse group with more independent ideas which would open up the branch and eliminate the insular way the CJ picks the membership now .
Chuck Horan
October 4, 2011
True. There are any number of ways to set up a fair and representative system. Almost anything would be an improvement over the current mess. Now, the council members are not accountable to anyone, because they do not represent anyone. The fiction is that they represent all citizens of the state. A group of identifiable constituent judges holding their feet to the fire would be a huge improvement.
Been There
October 4, 2011
Thank you Lando and Judge Horan for your insight and comments. A credible group of judicial officers (perhaps ACJ) hopefully will be working on the details of how responsive and responsible candidates can be democratically elected to the JC, because as JCW warns, it is not wise to wait for the legislature to act.
A democratically elected JC is desperately needed to “realign” the relationsip between the JC and its administrative agency. I don’t know exactly when the AOC began to overwhelm and lead rather than serve the JC, but I agree with those who look to the era when trial court unification and trial court funding were being pushed. And who would have thought it would have lead to this?
On a personal note the one thing I do not get is why the CJ continues on with the failed policies and programs of the “Builder/Dreamer” and “the Visionary”. She has an opportunity — in fact I think she has had several opportunities — to pivot from the past and to be a CJ who puts funding the trial courts first. She knows a lot about gambling, surely she knows what to do with a losing hand.
MrsKramer
October 3, 2011
It looks like many people have a good understanding of what could be done in the future to safeguard against compromised decisions being made in the judicial branch and not in the best interest of the people,.
I think it is going to be real difficult to get there without first doing a little house cleaning. Much of what they have done is easily evidenced to be criminal. (money missing & unlicensed contractors; pensions for non-state employees; record destruction when being audited; CCP425.19; retaliation against employees who evidence fraud, waste and abuse; etc).
Until there a forensic audit and some bad apples are HELD ACCOUNTABLE for spoiling the whole bunch, we are not going to get anywhere at reintilling integrity in the judicial branch. Left in place, they will continue to whittle away at any safeguards that stand in their way. We can’t take one step forward without first taking two steps back.
Wendy Darling
October 3, 2011
Published today, Monday, October 3, from the Metropolitan News Enterprise:
Chief Justice Says Budget Has Priority Over Analyst Report
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye on Friday said that the branch’s fiscal woes are a more pressing concern than implementing the recommendations set forth in a report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office last week which called for increased centralization of trial court operations.
She noted that the 20-page report from the Legislature’s nonpartisan fiscal and policy advisor “has appropriately engendered much discussion within the branch,” but “[i]n this fiscal environment…we have more immediate concerns.”
Branch leadership, the chief justice said, has been “laser focused on budget matters,” as “[e]nsuring public access to courts by restoring the judicial branch budget remains our main concern at this time and for the foreseeable future.”
Cantil-Sakauye also emphasized that the Judicial Council “has been addressing branch governance issues all year,” and has “initiated and encouraged dialogue and communication within the branch.”
Read the rest of the article at http://www.metnews.com/.
Long live the ACJ.
Wendy Darling
October 3, 2011
Published today, Monday, October 3, from The Recorder, the on-line publication of CalLaw, by Cheryl Miller:
Courts Brace for Realignment’s New Sentencing System
Cheryl Miller
SACRAMENTO — California on Monday will launch some of the most sweeping changes in sentencing laws over the past four decades as the state shifts significant criminal justice responsibilities to the counties and courts.
But some judges and lawyers say they’re embarking upon this historic prison realignment without a very good road map. As late as two weeks ago, the state was still tweaking rules and procedures, leaving courts, prosecutors, public defenders and law enforcement agencies scrambling to study the changes and to create a new system that will work when courthouse doors open Monday. The Judicial Council is still crafting new rules to guide judges.
Read the entire article: http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202517669059&Courts_Brace_for_Realignments_New_Sentencing_System&slreturn=1
Long live the ACJ.
JusticeCalifornia
October 3, 2011
Well here we are, at the ultimate bottom line. Ron George et al wanted the state to take over ultimate financial responsibility for the branch and its courthouses. Now, the state and the branch and the public are all naturally pondering this responsibility and all of its ramifications, and the expensive failure of the very unpopular status quo, and asking questions.
So IMHO here is the real $10 billion reality-check question:
Which of the following support a top to bottom BSA financial audit of the Judicial Branch at all levels?
a) the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council;
b) the AOC;
c) the CJA;
d) the ACJ;
e) the 58 trial courts
f) the appellate courts
g) the CA Supreme Court
Those who have nothing to hide will gladly support such an audit. Those who have something to hide will not. Here we are. Action talks, bull**** walks.
anonymous
October 3, 2011
The judicial branch could benefit from an inspector general appointed by the governor for a 10 year term to better manage some of these issues. A top-to-bottom audit would be enlightening.
JusticeCalifornia
October 4, 2011
It would appear that in facing externally imposed executive/legislative “realignment” measures sakauye and the trial courts and the ACJ and the CJA– and perhaps the branch’s favorite savvy lawyer/politicians (dunn, steinberg, feuer et al)– are finally realizing they should be sitting at a table together, figuring out how to do the right thing.
And of course the right thing is focusing on properly serving the public that elects and pays them.
In this process, I suggest that no one —and I do mean no one–should disregard those judges, employees, litigants, advocates and lawyers who, at extraordinary –and I do mean EXTRAORDINARY –personal expense, have documented, reported, and/or supported issues making this realization regarding the necessity of top to bottom branch respect and collaboration possible/plausible.
And most especially — do NOT forget that oppression will not be tolerated here.
Wendy Darling
October 5, 2011
Published today, Wednesday, October 5, from Courthouse News Service, by Maria Dinzeo:
Legislative Report on Courts Lands in Minefield of Battle for Control
By MARIA DINZEO
(CN) — California’s legislative analyst has called for the state judiciary to exert more control over local trial courts and in so doing put his hand into a hornet’s nest of controversy, with reactions from the chief justice, trial judges and legislators spanning caution, alarm and fury.
The legislative analyst concluded that individual trial courts are doing a worse job in controlling costs than the central bureaucracy. At the same time, the report also said the central bureaucrats should provide an accounting of what they do because there appears to be redundancy and waste.
“It is absolutely absurd,” said Assembly Majority Leader Charles Calderon (D-Montebello), who objected that the report does not consider all the accusations of reckless spending by the central Administrative Office of the Courts. “It is major fecal matter of the bull variety.”
http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/10/05/40333.htm
Also, it is rumored in the dark hallways of 455 Golden Gate Avenue today that the AOC’s Office of General Counsel has been employing three attorneys for well over a year that don’t even live in California, one lives in Switzerland, and the other two live back east.
Apparently, the AOC’s professed hiring freeze doesn’t apply out-of-state or in Europe.
Long live the ACJ.
MrsKramer
October 5, 2011
That’s interesting about the back east and Europe attorneys of the AOC. That would make me be inclined to question who their others clients are.
Been There
October 5, 2011
Holy moley! I never knew that lawyers were in such short supply at 455 Golden Gate Avenue that the Office of the General Counsel needed to outsource work.
If I were a suspicious person I would think someone wanted work done outside the purview of people working at 455 Golden Gate. I would have to imagine too that any entity or person seeking even a most informal discovery from any work produced for the AOC “back east” and in Switzerland would have a most difficult time doing so.
Michael Paul
October 6, 2011
There is no hiring freeze. I was recruited last month. I’m beginning to learn that when they say one thing, they mean exactly the opposite. For example the same AOC & Judicial Council that supported AB1749 are currently demurring, indicating that the California Whistleblower Protection Act did not apply to them on the date that I was fired an have come up with a novel argument to support it by extracting pieces of the legislative history as judicial notice. Mainly the ones that don’t include statements by the bills authors or the legislative digest. Should you be motivated and generous enough to supply me a amicus brief to assist this pro-per litigant in convincing the court that the AOC’s novel argument of supporting AB1749 and then arguing against it, I would be appreciative. michael_paul at michaelpaul.net
The hearing is in San Francisco superior court on Nov 14, dept 301 @9:30 Case no cgc-11-512423
Jimmy
October 5, 2011
Setting aside for a moment all of the other issues mentioned by Wendy Darling, what is the cost for workers’ compensation insurance coverage for an employee who resides out of state – or out of the country, for that matter. I am told that it is astronomical.
JusticeCalifornia
October 5, 2011
if/when/where/how/why have lawyers applied for and been hired to work for AOC out-0f-state/OFFSHORE Switzerland employment/appointments?
anna
October 6, 2011
Are you kidding???????????? Are you really surprised that the AOC is hiring outside council to write trial courts opinions???? Wake up! They have been doing it for some time. They are now, brazenly admitting that they hire “outside contractors” to write opinions for the trial courts, or discuss, the matters with trial courts, in violation of judicial cannons of ethics, [3.7b i think] in which they have a hand in “judicial matters” and which, in an “administrative” capacity, they have no jurisdiction to meddle in.
Why does the AOC need to hire any lawyers?????? As a matter of law, they are not allowed to involve themselves in anything judicial.
Ministerial, or administrative duties are not “judicial” and do not need a legal education.
If the AOC is involved in the above then every person would need to be a lawyer, and those who put forth any proposals [ Vickery, or Overholdt] would need to be a lawyer, or they are engaging in UPL, which is a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the current law.
Hello?????????????????
Just how far afield have we come???
As I said before, all of these people are engaging in crimes.
Jon Wintermeyer
October 6, 2011
The AOC’s FMU management hired an East Coast Firm to perform court building evaluation reports and those that I met and were assigned to the CC Courts were a scattered group of professionals from many different states all east of the Mississippi, but none had ever performed design work or construction management in CA, none were registered in CA or knowledgible of the CA building codes and seismic requirements.
All of them were more expensive because of airfares, hotels and daily per diem than if they hired CA professionals in the regional areas of the courts. The trial courts were not given copies of the reports unless we requested them. When the reports were reviewed they had many voids and problem areas in buildings were not addressed. Even specific areas shown to the reviewers were not included in the reports.
This was money not well spent and I know many Bay Area professionals that would have done a better set of reports than what was provided.
Wendy Darling
October 6, 2011
Not to mention the option of the Office of the State Architect and the Department of General Services, right there in Sacramento, which the AOC could use for virtually nothing.
But then the AOC wouldn’t be able to keep the contracts and costs hidden from public view.
Long live the ACJ.
JusticeCalifornia
October 7, 2011
We can all express shock, amazement, outrage, dismay etc. at the opinions, reports, slideshows, sideshows, freakshows, speeches, announcements, pronouncements, plans, committees, giggling Judicial Council meetings, etc—-but the bottom line pedal to the metal very uncomfortable questions remain—what is anybody in sought-after third branch power positions (and yes that includes Sakauye, the Judicial Council, Judicial Council committee members, top members of the AOC, CJP members, assigned judges, Steinberg, Feuer, Corbett, Evans, Dunn et al) doing to protect the public that paid/pays and/or elected/elects them, from the very well documented corruption-mismanagement of / waste in the biggest judiciary in the western world? That is NOT a rhetorical question. I want to know what these people (and their predecessors) have done/are doing to clean up the very ugly corrupt mess that has been/is an integral governing force in the CA judicial branch. They have ALL seen it, dealt with it, heard about it, so what have they done, and/or are they doing about it? I am asking this question now. Hopefully a grand jury or special prosecutor will be asking it later.
Stuart Miichael
October 8, 2011
The reason that trial court employees became local court employees when they were transferred from county civil service to court employment in the late 90’s instead of becoming State or AOC employees is because the unions opposed potential loss of bargain units under a single employer, and the AOC Director didn’t want unionized civil service employees in the same place with its own at-will unrepresented employees.
The resulting compromise made each court an individual employer with independent control of its own personnel system, establishing bargainiing units, each adopting its own personnel rules and “merit” protection systems with total authority given to its PJ/CEO, and conducting its own collective bargaining. As has been seen, this has led to wide disparities between courts and an inability to address branch-wide issues. (A prime example is the debacle of court interpreter bargaining by regions.)
Another significant negative outcome was that formerly county civil service mid-management employees became at-will, making it easier to get rid of those who didn’t “go along with the program” . We’ve seen what has happened to many of them in the CC, Marin and other trial courts.
Although the resultant decentraIzed system was undoubtedly better than remaining under stifiling county control, and may have been the only feasible solution at the time, the time has now come to consider other approaches. A state-wide personnel system – not under the AOC – may be the best step in the evolution of court employment.
antonatrail
October 8, 2011
Please! Don’t give the AOC another opportunity to quadruple exponentially in size by even whispering about a state-wide personnel system for the courts. Alfred Hitchcock couldn’t drum up a scarier scenario.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but didn’t the AOC connive to convince the court interpreters to come under the AOC’s “wing” only to grab public funds set aside for interpreting services in the courts and use them for the AOC’s pet projects? And the sad thing is, the interpreters don’t need the AOC until and unless English is the only accepted language spoken in the courts.
I know you mentioned “not under the AOC,” but while the AOC is not effectively muzzled and is still running ramrod through the justice system, we all know what the outcome would be. Anyone here old enough to remember “The Blob” from the 60s?
JusticeCalifornia
October 11, 2011
And for all court employees wondering how they would be treated by the AOC if they came under AOC control. . . . .
Take a look at what Fuentes has reportedly done in the AOC and what minimimi’s right hand henchwoman (Judicial Councilmember/Marin CEO Kim Turner) has done in Marin. I understand from stories on this blog Kiri Torre has done it wherever she goes.
Let’s start with harassing, ridiculing, undermining the credibility of , and ultimately eliminating those who who try to do a good job and serve the public rather than tow top leadership’s wasteful– and some would say criminal– you scratch my back I will scratch yours, we are taking over the world, party line.
And of course use of the budget issues as an excuse to get rid of those who know too much.
Careful selection of replacement employees, such that the chief quality of those selected will not be experience, integrity and professionalism, but rather “flexibility” — the willingness to unquestioningly do what they are told, even if this means bending or even flat-out breaking the rules and/or laws and/or purposefully harming the public. The role model for the perfect AOC employee is Tani Cantil Sakauye– an arrogant former gambling barmaid, with limited professional and intellectual experience and qualifications. Her first key tasks after her selection was announced were a) to publicly renounce her alleged commitment to ensuring due process and protecting families and children from violence by b) asking the Judicial Council to accept John Judnick’s AOC “report” excusing the destruction of child custody evidence by Kim Turner, Verna Adams, and the AOC in the middle of a state audit and ongoing custody cases; and then c) integrating Turner, Adams and other branch pariahs into key administrative/oversight positions in Sakauye’s new administration.
By gaining AOC control over selection of presiding judges, CEOs and ultimately trial court employees, every trial court can be stacked with “flexible” supplicants. All trial courts can then be readied for sale to the highest bidders and to do their share of AOC skimming/tithing. Those (including judges) refusing to tow the party line will be reported by supplicants to the AOC and dealt with accordingly.
Oh so very 1984? Absolutely. Far-fetched? Absolutely not. While it is ever so tempting to want to believe top leadership and its minions have the best interests of the branch at heart, this belief and the rose-colored glasses that go with it have helped get the branch into the mess in which it finds itself . The dead giveaways/red flags about the corrupt nature of what is going down are, for starters, a) the musical chairs in top leadership– where only old party faithfuls are allowed to stay in the game and advance; b) the careful hoarding/destruction of damning records, regardless of who asks for them, especially records that could reflect waste, mismanagement and misconduct; c) the ongoing careful placement of known compromised branch pariahs in key administrative/advisory positions; d) the current elimination/rewriting of history taking place in “transferring” information to the “new court website” and practically deifying problematic members of top leadership; and e) the threats made to and insults hurled at anyone at any level in all three branches who challenges or questions any of the above.
Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me. Top leadership is same as it ever was.
Stuart Michael
October 12, 2011
Court employees should absolutely not be under an AOC-run personnel system. That would be even worse than the current local systems.
Maybe an independent Court Employees Merit Commission with diverse & democratic membership including the judiciary, the bar, the executive & legislative Branches, the unions, other interested groups, and of course the public. The Commission could set rules and standards and oversee the administration of the court systems, and be the ultimate appellate body.
AOC and Supreme & Appellate Court employees – all currently at will – should be included.
Whistle-blower protections should be established, and public reports required.
These are just my own initial ideas – obviously not well thought out.
I’m sure there are other approaches – practical and otherwise – that should be considered
Demosthenes
October 27, 2011
I agree that court employees must not be placed under an AOC-run personnel system. AOC employees are unable to form or join a union, collectively bargain, or benefit from any contractual protections.
As an AOC employee, I can also verify that these conditions allow the AOC to violate wage and hour rules, and other labor laws at will. They can withhold your paycheck, they can direct you to falsify your timesheet (so that they can avoid paying overtime), and they can decide, at their whim, when and whether to pay you your full wages. All of these things have happened to me, and were all done at the express direction of the AOC Human Resources Division (in conjunction with management).
The AOC is answerable to no one; and the Human Resources Division is one of the most disfunctional and corrupt within the AOC. I wouldn’t wish them on anyone.
I believe the Legislative Analyst’s suggestion that the AOC assume full responsibility for the entire court system would simply result in subecting all judicial branch employees to the same mismanagemnt and abuse.
Alan Ernesto Phillips
October 30, 2011
For more AOC, JC trickle-down sociopathy:
Michael Paul
October 31, 2011
Well done Mr. Phillips.