(Re)join the Fight & Make it Happen.
The original legislation tied to AB1208 was mostly gutted by the Assembly Judiciary Committee. What came out of that committee was implementing legislation that continued to give carte blanche to the AOC to take trial court funds under the authority of the Judicial Council.
For those who are unfamiliar with the process, the implementing legislation can be amended at any time in the process. It is uncommon for implementing legislation to be significantly amended coming out of a committee but Speaker Perez and Assemblymember Calderon want to get something significant done this year. These new amendments broadly strengthen what was coming out of the judiciary committee.
2011-2012 AB1208Charles Calderon (A)
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 77202 of the Government Code is amended to read:
77202. (a) The Legislature shall make an annual appropriation to the Judicial Council for the general operations of the trial courts based on the request of the Judicial Council. The Judicial Council’s trial court budget request, which shall be submitted to the Governor and the Legislature, shall meet the needs of all trial courts in a manner that ensures a predictable fiscal environment for labor negotiations in accordance with the Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act (Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 71600) of Title 8), that promotes equal access to the courts statewide, and that promotes court financial accountability. The annual budget request shall include the following components:
(1) Commencing with the 2006–07 fiscal year, annual General Fund appropriations to support the trial courts shall be comprised of both of the following:
(A) The current fiscal year General Fund appropriations, which include all of the following:
(i) General Fund moneys appropriated for transfer or direct local assistance in support of the trial courts.
(ii) Transfers to the Judicial Administration Efficiency and Modernization Fund.
(iii) Local assistance grants made by the Judicial Council, including the Equal Access Fund.
(iv) The full year cost of budget change proposals approved through the 2006–07 fiscal year or subsequently approved in accordance with paragraph (2), but excluding lease-revenue payments and funding for costs specifically and expressly reimbursed through other state or federal funding sources, excluding the cost of one-time or expiring programs.
(B) A cost-of-living and growth adjustment computed by multiplying the year-to-year percentage change in the state appropriation limit as described in Section 3 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution by the sum of all of the following:
(i) The current year General Fund appropriations for the trial courts, as defined in subparagraph (A).
(ii) The amount of county obligations established pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 77201.1 in effect as of June 30, 2005, six hundred ninety-eight million sixty-eight thousand dollars ($698,068,000).
(iii) The level of funding required to be transferred from the Trial Court Improvement Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund pursuant to subdivision (k) of Section 77209, thirty-one million five hundred sixty-three thousand dollars ($31,563,000).
(iv) Funding deposited into the Court Facilities Trust Fund associated with each facility that was transferred to the state not less than two fiscal years earlier than the fiscal year for which the cost-of-living and growth adjustment is being calculated.
(v) The court filing fees and surcharges projected to be deposited into the Trial Court Trust Fund in the 2005–06 fiscal year, adjusted to reflect the full-year implementation of the uniform civil fee structure implemented on January 1, 2006, three hundred sixty-nine million six hundred seventy-two thousand dollars ($369,672,000).
(2) In addition to the moneys to be applied pursuant to subdivision (b) (c), the Judicial Council may identify and request additional funding for the trial courts for costs resulting from the implementation of statutory changes that result in either an increased level of service or a new activity that directly affects the programmatic or operational needs of the courts.
(b) (1) Based on the information submitted in the Governor’s proposed budget, and prior to the allocation of funds to each local trial court in accordance with the allocation schedule adopted by the Judicial Council pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 77200, the Legislature shall specify, in each annual Budget Act, the funding amounts to be allocated for programs of statewide concern from the total funds appropriated for trial court operations by the Legislature. For purposes of this paragraph, programs of statewide concern operate in the superior courts of multiple counties and may include, but shall not be limited to, equal access, court-appointed special counsel, family law information centers, model self-help, assigned judges, information technology, and administrative infrastructure. (such as continued funding for a uniform statewide accounting system).
(2) The Judicial Council and/or its designee is hereby required to allocate 100% of the funds appropriated for trial court operations, as designated in the budget under 45.10 – Support for Operation of Trial Courts, according to each court’s share of statewide operational funding as herein stated. For purposes of adjusting actual cost increases for individual courts, Judicial Council may submit a request to the Legislature of any amount of funding that it recommends to set aside for statewide court operation needs, including but not limited to retirement costs, additional judgeships, and employee benefits. The request shall include the purpose of such set asides to promote statewide policies, promote court efficiencies and to achieve cost savings in court operations. Legislative approval is required before any proposed set aside funds are re-directed and expended.
(4) Notwithstanding any other law, the Judicial Council, or its designee, shall not withhold or expend any portion of the total funds appropriated for trial court operations, as designated in the budget under 45.10 – Support for Operation of Trial Courts, by the Legislature for any statewide information technology or administrative infrastructure program, including existing projects such as the California Case Management System, that was not identified in the annual Budget Act, unless the Judicial Council, or its designee, first obtains the written approval of 662/3 percent of a proportional representation of all local trial courts. For purposes of this paragraph, proportional representation shall be calculated according to the number of judges in the superior court of each county as a percentage of the total number of judges authorized by Section 4 of Article VI of the California Constitution in all county superior courts statewide.
(b)
(c) Beginning on fiscal year 2011-2012, and for each fiscal year thereafter, each trial court’s allocation of the amount appropriated for trial court operations, as designated under 45.10 – Support for Operation of Trial Courts, shall be equal to the pro rata share of the prior fiscal year’s adjusted base budget, less the security base should realignment occur. Any workload or technical adjustments to a trial court’s base budgets made subsequent to enactment of the annual budget act shall be allocated separately from that year’s trial court operation fund and shall be incorporated into the trial courts base budget, adjusting the pro rata share, for the following fiscal year. Except for Modernization Fund and Improvement Fund, at the end of each fiscal year, any unspent funds allocated pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be distributed to each court based upon its pro rata share determined pursuant to this subdivision (c).
(d) (1) The Judicial Council shall adopt policies and procedures governing practices and procedures for budgeting in the trial courts in a manner that best ensures the ability of the courts to carry out their functions and may delegate the adoption to the Administrative Director of the Courts. The Administrative Director of the Courts shall establish budget procedures and an annual schedule of budget development and management consistent with these rules.
(2) Each trial court may transfer funds, once budgeted and allocated, between functions or line items or programs as directed by that court’s trial court management, provided that such transfers are in accord with statute. The trial court policies and procedures shall specify the process for a court to transfer existing funds between or among the budgeted program components to reflect changes in the court’s planned operation or to correct technical errors. If the process requires a trial court to request a specific transfer of existing funds, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall make such transfers and notify the Department of Finance, the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the Legislature’s budget committees, and the court’s affected labor organizations.
(3) The Judicial Council shall circulate for comment to all affected entities any amendments proposed to the trial court policies and procedures as they relate to budget monitoring and reporting. Final changes shall be adopted at a meeting of the Judicial Council.
SEC. 2. Section 77207 of the Government Code is amended to read:
77207. The Legislature shall appropriate trial court funding. The Controller shall apportion trial court funding payments to the courts as provided in Section 68085 pursuant to an allocation schedule adopted by the Judicial Council, and consistent with subdivision (b) of Section 77202.
SEC. 3. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) and (B) of section 68085 of the Government Code, are amended to read:
(a)(1) There is hereby established the Trial Court Trust Fund, the proceeds of which shall be apportioned for the purposes authorized in this section, including apportionment to the trial courts to fund trial court operations, as defined in Section 77003.
(2) The apportionment payments shall be made by the Controller. The final payment from the Trial Court Trust Fund for each fiscal year shall be made on or before August 31 of the subsequent fiscal year.
(A)
SEC. 4. Government Code section 68502.5 is amended to read:
(a) The Judicial Council may, as part of its trial court budget process, seek input from groups and individuals as it deems appropriate including, but not limited to, advisory committees and the Administrative Director of the Courts. The trial court budget process may include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) The receipt of budget requests from the trial courts.
(2) The review of the trial courts’ budget requests and evaluate them against performance criteria established by the Judicial Council by which a court’s performance, and efficiency can be measured.
(3) The annual adoption of the projected cost in the subsequent fiscal year of court operations as defined in Section 77003 for each trial court. This estimation shall serve as a basis for recommended court budgets, which shall be developed for comparison purposes and to delineate funding responsibilities.
(4) The annual approval of a schedule for the allocation of moneys to individual courts as stated in section 77202 and an overall trial court budget for forwarding to the Governor for inclusion in the Governor’s proposed State Budget. The overall trial court budget shall be based on the performance criteria established pursuant to paragraph (2), on a minimum standard established by the Judicial Council for the operation and staffing of all trial court operations, and on any other factors as determined by the Judicial Council. This minimum standard shall be modeled on court operations using all reasonable and available measures to increase court efficiency. The overall trial court budget shall assure that all trial courts receive funding for the minimum operating and staffing standards before funding operating and staffing requests above the minimum standards,
(5) The allocation of funds in the Trial Court Improvement Fund to ensure equal access to trial courts by the public, to improve trial court operations, and to meet trial court emergencies.
(6) Upon approval of the trial courts’ budget by the Legislature, the preparation during the course of the fiscal year of allocation schedules for payments to the trial courts, consistent with Section 68085, which shall be submitted to the Controller’s office at least 15 days before the due date of any allocation.
(7) The establishment of procedures for a court to report its exercise of authority to transfer trial court funding moneys from one functional category to another in order to address needs in any functional category.
(9) At the request of the presiding judge of a trial court, an independent review of the funding level of the court to determine whether it is adequate to enable the court to discharge its statutory and constitutional responsibilities.
(10) From time to time, a review of the level of fees charged by the courts for various services and prepare recommended adjustments for forwarding to the Legislature.
(11) Provisions set forth in rules adopted pursuant to Section 77206 of the Government Code.
(b) Courts and counties shall establish procedures to allow for the sharing of information as it relates to approved budget proposals and expenditures that impact the respective court and county budgets. The procedures shall include, upon the request of a court or county, that a respective court or county shall provide the requesting court or county a copy of its approved budget and, to the extent possible, approved program expenditure component information and a description of budget changes that are anticipated to have an impact on the requesting court or county. The Judicial Council shall provide to the Legislature on December 31, 2001, and yearly thereafter, budget expenditure data at the program component level for each court.
SEC. 5. Government Code section 77203 is amended to read:
A trial court may carry unexpended funds over from one fiscal year to the next and those funds shall be the funds of that court, and shall not be reallocated or redirected without the consent of the court’s trial court management.
SEC. 6. Subsection (a) of the Government Code section 77206 is amended to read:
(a) The Judicial Council may regulate the budget and fiscal management of the trial courts. The Judicial Council, in consultation with the Controller, shall maintain appropriate regulations for recordkeeping and accounting by the courts. The Judicial Council shall seek to ensure, by these provisions, both of the following:
SEC. 7. Subsection (c) of the Government Code section 77009 is amended to read:
(c) Moneys deposited into a bank account established pursuant to subdivision (a) for the Trial Court Operations Fund that are appropriated in the Budget Act and allocated or reallocated to any trial court shall be payable only for the purposes set forth in Sections 77003 and 77006.5, and for services purchased by the court pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 77212.
SEC. 8. Government Code section 77006.5 is amended to read:
As used in this chapter, “trial court funding” means the amount of state funds provided for the operation of the trial courts, as defined in Section 77003, appropriated in the Budget Act, and allocated or reallocated by law.
SEC. 9. Government Code section 77200 is amended to read:
On and after July 1, 1997, the state shall assume sole responsibility for the funding of court operations, as defined in Section 77003 and Rule 10.810 of the California Rules of Court as it read on January 1, 2007. In meeting this responsibility, the state shall do all of the following:
(a) Deposit in the Trial Court Trust Fund, for subsequent allocation to or for the trial courts, all county funds remitted to the state pursuant to Section 77201 until June 30, 1998, pursuant to Section 77201.1 from July 1, 1998, until June 30, 2006, inclusive, and pursuant to Section 77201.3, thereafter.
(b) Be responsible for the cost of court operations incurred by the trial courts in the 1997-98 fiscal year and subsequent fiscal years.
(c) Allocate funds to the individual trial courts pursuant to an allocation schedule as set forth in section 77202, but in no case shall the amount allocated to the trial court in a county be less than the amount remitted to the state by the county in which that court is located pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 77201 until June 30, 1998, pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 77201.1 from July 1, 1998, until June 30, 2006, inclusive, and pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 77201.3, thereafter.
(d) The Judicial Council shall submit its allocation schedule to the Controller at least five days before the due date of any allocation.
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The attachment with notes – Amendments AB 1208
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The next step for AB1208 is the Assembly Committee on Appropriations. While there is currently no hearing scheduled, that hearing should take place some time next week. Your contact information for the Assembly Appropriations Committee is as follows:
| Committee Members | District | Phone | |
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Dem-39 | (916) 319-2039 | Assemblymember.Fuentes@assembly.ca.gov |
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Rep-73 | 916) 319-2073 | Assemblymember.Harkey@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-40 | (916) 319-2040 | Assemblymember.Blumenfield@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-51 | (916) 319-2051 | Assemblymember.Bradford@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-58 | (916) 319-2058 | Assemblymember.Calderon@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-23 | (916) 319-2023 | Assemblymember.Campos@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-48 | (916) 319-2048 | Assemblymember.Davis@assembly.ca.gov |
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Rep-59 | (916) 319-2059 | Assemblymember.Donnelly@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-43 | (916) 319-2043 | Assemblymember.Gatto@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-52 | (916) 319-2052 | Assemblymember.Hall@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-19 | (916) 319-2019 | Assemblymember.Hill@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-50 | (916) 319-2050 | Assemblymember.Lara@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-47 | (916) 319-2047 | Assemblymember.Mitchell@assembly.ca.gov |
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Rep-2 | (916) 319-2002 | Assemblymember.Nielsen@assembly.ca.gov |
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Rep-72 | (916) 319-2072 | Assemblymember.Norby@assembly.ca.gov |
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Dem-69 | (916) 319-2069 | Assemblymember.Solorio@assembly.ca.gov |
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Rep-70 | (916) 319-2070 | Assemblymember.Wagner@assembly.ca.gov |
Chuck Horan
May 19, 2011
The AOC and their supporters moaned and groaned about “”unfairness” when the bill was “gutted” and pared down a few weeks ago. Now they are complaining about “unfairness” when the bill is, for lack of a better phrase, “ungutted”. I suggest that they actually view any reform as unfair–unfair to their power, to their insularity, to what they view as their prerogatives and to the prerogatives of their small group of go-to judges, and unfair to their continued attempt to dominate the trial courts with their ill conceived boondoggles and central planning exercises.
ACJ leadership has tried in vain to search for the “in branch” solution the opponents of AB 1208 claim to want. These efforts, which continued through this past Monday, have been categorically rejected at every turn. Those claiming “unfairness” in the process have only themselves to blame for offering no solutions themselves.
wendy darling
May 19, 2011
How fair was it in June of 2009 when the Judicial Council, Vickrey, and the AOC attempted to covertly re-write Government Code Sections 77001-77206.1, which would have gutted the trail courts rights to internal self-governance and instead give all of that authority solely to the AOC, and doing so by slipping the revisions into trailer bill language without advising the trial courts of what the Judicial Council and the AOC was doing before doing it? How “fair” was that? Monday, December 28, 2009, Metropolitan News Enterprise: Need for Oversight of AOC is More Apparent Than Ever, http://www.metnews.com.
How fair was it when the Judicial Council and the AOC to totally rewrite Judicial Branch Governance Policies and enact them in secret, and for the AOC to then subsequently totally rewrite the California Rules of Court pertaining to branch governance, including making an unprecedented grant of policy-making power to the AOC, and get those rules passed without any council discussion, and without the public and members of the judiciary being given any chance to comment prior to their enactment? How “fair” was that? Friday, February 12, 2010, Metropolitan News Enterprise: Secret Judicial Council Vote Rewrote Branch Governance Policy, http://www.metnews.com.
How fair is it to try and falsely sell “an approach” to the media regarding the failure of the Judicial Council and the AOC to enact a Trial Court Bill of Rights for 13 years, despite a very clear directive from the State legislature that they were required to do so? How “fair” was that? How fair is it to engage in censorship at the highest levels of public administration, in the judicial branch of government no less, by requiring pre-approved statements by members of the public who request to speak at public meetings of the Judicial Council? How “fair” is that? How fair is it to tell judges to shut up, or address them with profanity, when they attempt to speak about internal governance issues facing the branch at public meetings of the Judicial Council? How “fair” is that? How fair is it for there to be no democracy on the Judicial Council? How “fair” is that?
How fair was it for the Judicial Council and the AOC to close the trial courts once a month while at the same time giving AOC administrators and senior management promotions and double-digit pay raises? Or how fair was it for the Judicial Council and the AOC to take hundreds of millions of dollars out of the Trial Court Trust Fund without any legitimate authority to do so, and in order to use that money to continue to fund CCMS? How “fair” was that?
How fair is it for the Judicial Council and the AOC to force the trial courts to use unlicensed state contractors, and then to also require the trial courts to use limited trial court funds to have to pay those very same unlicensed contractors for the insanity of not being able to change a light bulb for anything other than just under $500.00, among other insane costs? How fair is that?
How fair is it for the Judicial Council, the AOC, and Vickrey to intentionally mislead the State legislature, and the public, about the true costs of CCMS, and then when they get caught, to dismiss their accountability with the response of “It’s time to move on”? How “fair” is that? How fair was it, in the wake of the release of the BSA audit on CCMS and the AOC identifying gross mismanagement and failed oversight and administrative practices by Vickrey and the AOC, and the subsequent letter from the State legislature calling for Vickrey’s termination, for the Chief Justice to not only defend Vickrey and the AOC, but to praise him? How “fair” was that?
How fair is it for the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, and the AOC, to turn a deaf ear and a blind eye to the many and serious problems governance and ethical problems going in the branch, and do nothing but attack and attempt to discredit those that speak out, while at the same doing absolutely nothing to address or correct those problems? Really, how “fair” is that?
This is just a partial list of the “unfair” actions and conduct by the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, Vickrey, and the AOC. Before the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, Vickrey, and the AOC can whine about it all being so “unfair” they should first take a good hard look to themselves, and accept that they cannot claim “unfairness” for something they themselves do not practice.
There is nothing “unfair” about AB 1208, or for going to the State legislature to try and address the serious problems in the judicial branch, especially in the face of the absolute refusal and abdication of the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council to do anything about these problems for, at a minimum, the last several years.
In the face of the undeniable truth of this refusal and abdication, it is the right of the public, to turn to the State legislature and demand accountability and change . This right is founded in one of the most fundamental provisions and tenets of the principles this country was founded on, as stated in the Declaration of Independence:
“Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. … When a long train of abuses and usurpations pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security .”
If the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, and the AOC want to continue to indefensibly whine and insist this all just so “unfair” they need to get busy on re-writing the Declaration of Independence.
Until such time as that happens, we no longer to consent to deceptive and unethical conduct in the judicial branch. We no longer consent to shut up and obey. We no longer consent to the status quo and speak with one voice of the Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, Vickrey, and the AOC. And if the only place that the serious issues in the judicial branch will be heard, listened to, and addressed, is the State legislature, then that is where we will go, and it is our absolute right, our duty, to do so.
And there is nothing “unfair” about it.
Long live the ACJ.
Mrs. Kramer
May 19, 2011
Don’t forget the unfairness (and illegality) of Penal Code 118 being ignored by the courts when the DEFENDANTS are the AOC/JC. See 4.29.11 Reply Brief, Pg 4, Negley v. JC/AOC
https://judicialcouncilwatcher.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/negleyreplyredacted.pdf
Mrs. Kramer
May 19, 2011
What they have established is an oligarchy. One that feeds on unfair practices in the judicial branch and self promotion/self preservation by any means available. This is clearly demonstrated many times over as being adverse to the best interests of the people and taxpayers of California. Thank you, Judge Horan, for your leadership, tenacity, courage and integrity.
antonatrail
May 19, 2011
And thank you, Charles Calderon, for your continuing attention to AB 1208! So many will benefit from your hard work and persistence in the face of who-knows what pressures.
wendy darling
May 19, 2011
Published today, Thursday, May 19, from Courthouse News Service by Maria Dinzeo:
S.F. and Coast Courts Mixed on IT Project, By MARIA DINZEO. http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/05/19/36705.htm
Long live the ACJ.
One Who Knows
May 19, 2011
Isn’t the language in AB 1208 really a reflection of what was agreed upon in the Assembly Judiciary Committee? Looks that way to me. If so, the ACJ and Assembly Member Calderon have kept their end of the deal and so did the Asembly. The AOC will continue to complain because they are deeply invested in the status quo….
JusticeCalifornia
May 19, 2011
I am sitting out on the discussion about the language of the legislation, as this appears to be something the judges are far more qualified to discuss.
But Wendy, the article you posted illustrates exactly WHY legislation is necessary, and why the branch is where it is right now.
It is useful to see what these courts have said in the article and also to see what their maintenance costs are.
Of course, Marin stood out like a sore thumb. Turner’s comments on the auditor form (click on the link) are actually hilarious compared to the other courts. What isn’t so hilarious is the amount Marin paid in 2008-2009 for its woefully archaic system. And Turner is the person the minimimi selected to serve on her CCMS oversight and CEO committees?
According the the census, Marin is the smallest county mentioned in the article. It has a population of 250,750. In 2008-2009, it spent a whopping $2,514,240 on its ridiculously bad system. That is more than ANY other county except Orange (would love to hear an analysis of Orange’s costs).
To put that number in perspective, Alameda has a population of 1,491,482, and it spent $2,328,170.
Or how about this: Santa Cruz has population of 256,218, and it spent just $420,688.
Clearly, Turner was NOT selected to be on the CCMS oversight committee based on her incredible financial management and oversight of a stellar county court IT system.
No, it would appear perhaps a quid pro quo took place. Namely: the AOC covered for Marin’s Kim Turner and Verna Adams when the Marin family court audit took place by giving them permission to shred damning child custody evidence, and helping them block auditor access for almost a year while destruction was effected.
Marin’s Turner and Adams returned the favor by falling all over themselves gushing about CCMS during the CCMS audit — and signing up to perform current “oversight” functions for the AOC.
Don’t you all want this top leadership status quo to continue? Don’t you completely trust minimimi’s judgment now? Don’t you all want your very own Kim Turner installed in your court (however big or little it is) to spend your money, shred your documents, make sure you have one of the worst systems around to show for it — and report back to minimimi if you squeal in pain?
JusticeCalifornia
May 19, 2011
One more thing.
Don’t forget this:
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/projectfailures/marin-county-sues-deloitte-alleges-fraud-on-sap-project/9774
The Marin Court’s over-the-top endorsement of Deloitte’s CCMS notwithstanding the fact that Marin County filed suit IN THE MARIN COURT against Deloitte regarding a failed IT project seems a bit odd, now doesn’t it?
wendy darling
May 19, 2011
Well, Kim Turner has a demonstrated track record for staying “on script,” especially when it comes to the Judicial Council and the AOC. She’s had an abundance of practice, after all, starting with the little embezzlement scheme by Turner’s former boss/Marin Court CEO, and his girlfriend, while Turner just looked the other way.
JusticeCalifornia
May 20, 2011
Wendy, you mean the $650,ooo in court IT contracts Turner’s “friend” and “boss extraordinaire” (former Marin CEO John Montgomery) funneled to his live in girlfriend, and his other inappropriate expenditures, which Turner knew about (and in some cases signed off on), but refused to reveal until a financial audit of the Marin court was immediately pending? Those very acts for which she was soundly criticized in a 2005/2006 AOC report?
Or are you referring to her wholesale destruction of Marin Family Court child custody evidence after the 2009 BSA audit of the Marin Family Court commenced?
Or both?
minimimi obviously knows Turner’s history — including Turner’s coverup for her boss, and her destruction of child custody evidence in the middle of an audit.
Therefore, notwithstanding Turner’s shady past, and exhorbitant financial track record regarding Marin’s own miserable court records system, we can all conclude that Turner exhibits precisely the qualifications minimimi values and is looking for in a) a superior court CEO (after all, she selected turner to chair her special CEO committee); and b) her CCMS oversight committee. Someone who spends exhorbitant amounts of money on a bad case management system who will look the other way and destroy damning evidence.
Let’s just call it like it is. Dirty. How much more do we need to know about our new cj minimimi?
Is it any wonder at all that the branch is falling apart at the seams, and has lost all credibility, when our former and current TOP JUDICIAL OFFICER of the largest judiciary in the Western world places the Kim Turners of the branch in key financial, management, policy and oversight positions?
It is actually remarkable that this is taking place in the judicial branch, which is supposed to be beyond reproach. If this were a normal publicly held business, and the CEO/CFO of the company hired people with Turner’s track record to set policy/oversee/manage the company, at the expense and over the loud protests of investors, can you imagine the lawsuits that could pile up? Can you imagine the civil and criminal investigations that would be called for?
I keep wondering when the judges of this state are going to take action to save the branch and mount a hostile takeover. Oh wait, that’s kind of what’s happening, right?
What other alternatives are there? Any bright ideas? Maybe impeachment of minimimi is an idea people should also start getting comfortable with?
The legislature has NO ALTERNATIVE but to step in and protect the public when it watches this kind of thing go down. In actuality THE JUDGES who make up the branch have an ethical duty to protect the public and make sure the branch is being administered properly. While they may not (at present) be able to control or even influence the CJ/JC/AOC because the CJ has the power of appointment, the trial courts can take back power over their own financial and administrative affairs.
It would appear to me that those with any concern at all should make it a priority to work with the authors of this bill and the ACJ to pass 1208 in a form all can live with. If a vote is taking place next week, this should happen ASAP.
Just my opinion.
courtflea
May 19, 2011
Judge Horan, with all due respect, what did the ACJ do to allieve the fears of those judges that are anti 1208 due to concerns that the largest courts will essentially replace the AOC in deciding who gets what in the budget, by virtue of their size and influence with the legislature? Don’t get me wrong, I agree with 1208 in concept but what was the answer/solution suggested to alieviate these judges concerns so they can buy into the legislation?
Sorry to keep repeating myself.
wendy darling
May 19, 2011
Hello courtflea . . . perhaps you could share what the less-than-the-largest courts would like to see in AB 1208 that would alleviate those concerns?
Some of us have been hearing that among the smaller courts the concern is that Los Angeles would “out-vote” them because of their size under AB 1208’s provisions for a “66 2/3 percent of a proportional representation of all local trial courts. For purposes of this paragraph, proportional representation shall be calculated according to the number of judges in the superior court of each county as a percentage of the total number of judges authorized by Section 4 of Article VI of the California Constitution in all county superior courts statewide.”
What would the less-than-the-larger courts suggest as a workable compromise/alternative solution in the language of AB 1208 that would alleviate judges concerns so they can support the legislation? Inquiring minds want to know . . .
Long live the ACJ.
Chuck Horan
May 20, 2011
Courtflea, I too would be interested in knowing what formula or language you would prefer.
This is not and never has been an “LA” bill. Take it from one who has been involved since day 1. It has been characterized as an LA bill by Judge O’Malley, Judge Herman, and several others because they hope that “divide and conquer” strategy will work, plain and simple, because it usually DOES work. Believe me, the AOC uses this strategy all day long.
ANY democratization will require that each judge have a voice. We believe each should have an EQUAL voice. That’s what the proportional representation language tries to do. It would be foolish to ignore the fact that roughly 450 judges are in Los Angeles. That’s a fact, like it or not. California divides its courts up by county, and some counties have millions of people, some a relative handful of constituents. LA has millions and millions. LA has more judges that about the thirty smaller counties combined. So, how do we insure representation for the LA judges (really, LA’s constituents) without giving LA a veto? The 2/3 number does that, since LA is well under 1/3 of the state’s judges. Someone can correct me, but it’s under 30% I believe, somewhere in the 20s. That said, we welcome suggestions as to how to accomplish fair representation without giving LA “too much power”, whatever that means to you.
We can’t, for example, give EVERY court a veto. That would mean that ANY court, big or small, court stop a statewide project favored by 95% of the judges. That would be truly unfair. We can’t require 100% agreement on a statewide project, because then we’d never get anything done–nothing is agreed upon by 100%. We used two thirds because it seems to work–it would not give LA a veto since that concerns people, but WOULD require that a project have significant proven support before EVERYONE’S money, including the money of the objecting courts, is spent on it.
Look at it this way for a moment: You live in California. You have more representation in the House of Representatives than, say, Vermont. Is this unfair? Nope, not hardly, there are more people in California, more commerce, more tax money, more everything–more at stake, more contributed to the pot. Now, the counter is that California has two Senators, and so does Maine, even though Maine is smaller.
I guess it might get down to this: Would you prefer the status quo of all power remaining with the AOC/Judicial Council, or spreading it among the trial courts, even if that means that LA, being larger, has more power than a county with, say, two judges. It’s a very very easy call for me.
Problem is that those who oppose AB1208 will continue to oppose it no matter what it says.
Those who are for it, but who feel it needs improvement, must come up with language.
This bill cannot be all things for all people–it is legislation, and thus is a creature of compromise. Please, weigh in with suggestions. Those in power have refused to make suggestions, choosing to simply oppose and argue for the status quo. If you or anyone else who supports 1208 (or even those who oppose it) can propose language that will allay your concerns about LA, please let me have it, and soon. The next hearing is very soon.
Michael Paul
May 20, 2011
It’s beneficial to re-iterate one of Judge Horan’s points from a different perspective: Being inside the AOC in a mid-level position dealing directly with the trial courts.
The AOC looks at (and has always looked at) the L.A. Courts as the proverbial eight hundred pound gorilla that they prefer to not take on in any capacity. They are wary of L.A.’s opinion and they don’t want L.A.’s involvement in AOC affairs because they’re genuinely afraid of the power that one court holds in general, with a third of the states judges attached to it.
There has always been an internal effort at the AOC to consider all courts – “and then there is L.A.” like it were another planet altogether. In many respects, it is another planet. But it is part of our court system that I personally believe has been denied significant input into judicial branch affairs across the board under the committee level and at the AOC level.
I can appreciate courtflea’s concerns about the smaller counties. However today, those smaller counties have more influence than L.A. does over judicial branch /AOC affairs and somehow, I think that needs to change to be more representative. In my mind, what the current AB1208 amendments do is prevent the AOC from drawing from an extremely limited pool of cheerleaders (the elite 1%) to define governance issues for everyone else. It’s not democracy by any means but it sets in motion the theory that large, branchwide decisions should be made by a wider audience and not just the elite 1%.
007
May 20, 2011
Judge Horan is right: LA will have approximately 27% of the vote assuming all judges voted the same way. The devil is in the details. If the voting mechanism is one-judge-one-vote (notwithstanding the logistical feat of running that vote) then theres no guarantee that any one court will be able veto a particular item. If the model is run like the electoral college, same applies except now it would only take LA and another large court to vote in concert to strike something down. This could become problematic if two large southern California courts decide to veto a particular item of interest to rest of the state. Is there any insight on how the voting mechanism is envisioned?
Judicial Council Watcher
May 20, 2011
Someone correct me if I am wrong but it appears to be defined in the recently amended implementing legislation.
4) Notwithstanding any other law, the Judicial Council, or its designee, shall not withhold or expend any portion of the total funds appropriated for trial court operations, as designated in the budget under 45.10 – Support for Operation of Trial Courts, by the Legislature for any statewide information technology or administrative infrastructure program, including existing projects such as the California Case Management System, that was not identified in the annual Budget Act, unless the Judicial Council, or its designee, first obtains the written approval of 662/3 percent of a proportional representation of all local trial courts. For purposes of this paragraph, proportional representation shall be calculated according to the number of judges in the superior court of each county as a percentage of the total number of judges authorized by Section 4 of Article VI of the California Constitution in all county superior courts statewide.
——————————————————————–
I read that 2/3rds of the states’ judges must agree to spend their local funds on statewide JC/AOC initiatives before the AOC can spend that money. That is one high hurdle when you consider only half of the judges in the state voted in the recent CJA survey.
The legislation does not prohibit all other courts from utilizing their own funds to pursue such branchwide initiatives. It damn near makes casting a vote mandatory for each judge if the AOC wishes to sell the concept of a boondoggle. Is that a bad thing? I don’t think so. It’s better than not having any say at all like about 1,200 judges currently don’t have.
JusticeCalifornia
May 20, 2011
Keeping everything in perspective, and not at all taking away from the above conversation: right now the non-elected voting members of the Judicial Council get to vote, right? And the judges statewide don’t get to vote, right?
wendy darling
May 20, 2011
And under the provisions of AB 1208, the elected judges statewide would, at last, have the right to vote, right?
Long live the ACJ.
Mrs. Kramer
May 20, 2011
JCW, I think you raise a good point. The intent appears to be that if two out of three CA judges who cast votes think something is a good idea, then it passes. But that is not what the language says to me.
If there are 1800 judges in CA, then the way I read it, there would always have to be 1200 support votes before something passes. So even if 3 or of 3 vote “yes” on something, but only 1000 vote, it still doesn’t pass because it didn’t reach the magic 1200 number, is the way I read it.
Also, its not clear to me “For purposes of this paragraph, proportional representation shall be calculated according to the number of judges in the superior court OF EACH COUNTY AS THE PERCENTAGE of the total number of judges authorized by Section 4 of Article VI of the California Constitution in all county superior courts statewide.”
Does that mean that if 2/3 of LA county judges vote “yes”, that this is tabulated as 1 “yes” county out of 58 counties voting? The language is not clear to me if “proportional representation” means 2/3 of all votes must be “yes” or if 2/3 of all counties must vote “yes”. Maybe I am missing something.
Chuck Horan
May 20, 2011
I don’t think 1208 envisions a direct vote of the state’s judges–it says written approval from 2/3 of proportional representation of the trial courts. If direct judge voting was envisioned, it would not say “trial courts” or use the proportional representation language. It has the proportional representation language precisely so that the voice of each judge is counted equally. Otherwise, if it said “2/3 of the trial courts”, 200 or less judges who make up the smalles30 or so trial courts could decide for everyone. We can’t have a veto by one court, nor can we have the tyranny of the minority, where all small courts, who make up 2/3 of the COUNTIES but probably less than 10% of the judges, get the call either. This is called–representative democracy. lol
Courts generally take positions on matters through their executive committee (in LA, for example, there is an elected executive committee of 20 or so judges that votes on things like this). Courts too small to have an executive committee usually speak through their Presiding Judge. Of course, any court could decide to poll its judges, but I do not believe that 1208 envisions a statewide vote of judges, though I’d be fine with that approach. What is important is that the AOC and Council not get the call on everything, and that the TRIAL COURTS get their say. Now, they have absolutely NO representation. The presiding judges committee, for example, is strictly an ADVISORY committee. As we all know, their advice is often ignored–0for example, they urged the council to remain neutral on 1208 and to oppose 109.
The council instead opposed 1208 and remained neutral on 109, though undoubtedly 99% of judges were opposed to 109.
Mrs. Kramer
May 20, 2011
It’s glaringly obvious that the judges need a deciding voice in what is done, not just an advisory voice.
Still trying to understand how the 66.67 % of the vote is tabulated. LA county has 27% of the judges. A committee of approx 21.
So does that mean that if 14 LA committee members (2/3 of 21) vote “yes” to allocate funds to AOC; this would represent 27% of the required 66.67% , based on proportional representation?
Judicial Council Watcher
May 20, 2011
One thing is for certain. If the AOC finds a loophole, they will attempt to float an aircraft carrier through it. This representation issue sounds like it may need a bit more clarification in the enabling legislation as you’re not going to be taking this issue to court and asking any judge what the legislature meant.
Chuck Horan
May 20, 2011
Mrs. Kramer, you are making it way too hard. Hypothetically, if LA’s executive committee voted “Yes” on a project by a 2 to 1 majority, or ANY majority, LA would be in the “Yes” columm. If, on the other hand, LA’s executive committee voted “No” by whatever margin, LA would be in the “No” category. That would be the vote of 27% of the judges in the state. Courts would not be fractionalized as you are hypothesizing. The legislation says 2/3 of the COURTS, not 2/3 of the judges. Courts, as I explained, speak through their executive committees. They vote. What they say goes. They are elected representatives of their courts.
Mrs. Kramer
May 20, 2011
Judge Horan, thank you for helping to explain this to me. I am actually doing research on agnotology over environmental illnesses and the role of the Ca legal system aiding it to continue. Agnotology is the study of culturally induced ignorance or doubt, mainly over matters of science. The current heirachy of our judicial/legal system appears to be a major determining factor impacting US policy as a whole. I am intending to write of it in a few different venues.
You write, “The legislation says 2/3 of the COURTS, not 2/3 of the judges. Courts, as I explained, speak through their executive committees. They vote. What they say goes. They are elected representatives of their courts.”
I am probably not understanding what you are saying because I don’t understand:
What is the difference between a court and a judge? How many courts are there in CA?
Also, I don’t mean to infer anything is fractionalized. I am just trying to understand how the votes are cast and counted. I clearly grasp the concept that trial courts/judges need a deciding voice in how our tax dollars are allocated for the good of the people and I whole heartedly support AB1208.
Thank you for helping me to understand this aspect of the matter.
Mrs. Kramer
May 20, 2011
JCW, You mean like someone professing their personal vote represents the vote of judges from five counties…and then submitting the vote on faux letterhead? What are the ground rules for who gets to say if their judges voted up or down?
Chuck Horan
May 21, 2011
Mrs. Kramer:
There are 58 “courts” in the state–one “court” per county. That’s the way we are using the term.
Some counties have more judges, i.e., more courtrooms. LA has over 450 judges, i.e., courtrooms, and many courthouses holding these courtrooms. But LA has but one Superior Court–it is composed of all of the judges. Some counties have as few as two judges. Some have around 100, some 40, some 60, etc. It is basically a function of population of the county.
Judges hear cases arising in their respective counties, and they serve in their county, and they stand for election in their county.
courtwatcher
May 20, 2011
As noted by Judge Horan, AB 1208 is not a “LA bill”.
There are many small courts judges who belong to the ACJ. The Rural Judges Forum, which is part of the CJA, was instrumental in turning back the AOC/JC attempts to amend Art. IV of the Constitution which would have actually given the JC much broader authority to than it currently has over the trial courts.
Smaller to mid-sized courts have their own concerns about the establishment of a constitutionally mandated centralized system of trial court administration. There has been a suspicion for a long time that the driving force behind these statewide technology initiatives was the AOC’s desire to eventually regionalize courts, particularly the smaller ones. Once the statewide financial, case management and HR systems were in place, the regionalization concept would be a much easier sell to the legislature.
Statewide systems give the AOC the ability to argue one presiding judge and one CEO could oversee an entire region comprised of 2 to 10judge courts. The AOC would argue that since the statewide systems were in place, local administration would be unnecessary. This was the model in Utah, where Bill Vickery was the state court administrator. It also provides an explanation of why the AOC pushed so hard for a single, statewide CCMS, without regard for costs, actual need, functionality in small courts, etc. The JC/AOC could appoint the CEO and have complete control over the administraion of the trial courts.
JusticeCalifornia
May 20, 2011
excellent points courtwatcher.
JusticeCalifornia
May 20, 2011
This regional plan would be a while in the making.
I daresay there would be a shortlist for those who would be appointed to be the all-powerful regional CEO contingents (those who have total “control” a la 1984–retroactive, current and future– of third branch “reality”, meaning the ability to tamper with or preserve intact official and unofficial court files and register of actions, and the dossiers of court employees/appointees), with a few additions like Curtis Childs, Kim Turner and most lately, Melissa Fowler Bradley. I apologize in advance to those who suffer guilt purely by association.
Judicial Administration Award
1993 Edward M. Kritzman
1994 Arthur Sims and Diane Nunn
1995 Sheila Calabro
1996 Ronald G. Overholt
1997 Alan Slater
1998 Susan Null and William C. Vickrey
1999 Frederick “Fritz” Ohlrich and Kiri S. Torre
2000 Stephen V. Love and Christine Patton
2001 Michael M. Roddy
2002 Tamara Lynn Beard and Ray LeBov
2003 Jeanne Millsaps and Christine M. Hansen
2004-2005 Jody Patel and Karen M. Thorson
2006 Tressa Sloan Kentner and Patricia M. Yerian
2007 Ken Torre
2008 Sharol Strickland
2009 Stephen Nash
Defense of the above/Predictions of others welcome.
wendy darling
May 21, 2011
Many of the people on this list have very tainted histories in the California judicial branch. I know for certain, however, that Sharol Strickland, does not. Strickland was, and is, one of the most honorable, truthful, ethical, and decent persons to have ever served in the judicial branch, or in public service to the people of the State of California, right up until the time she retired last year as the Court Executive Officer for the Butte Superior Court.
courtflea
May 20, 2011
I am glad to see this discussion. However, we don’t need the “rule of the minority” or the majority. And if you count all counties outside of LA, LA does not have the majority of judges in the state. I personally am not qualified to submit language that would rectify this whole legislation but my question was to find out what judges are doing that support 1208 (members of the ACJ or not) to acheive concensus amongst the judges to support the bill. The frustration that has been expressed about not being able to do that frankly smacks of the same complaint that the AOC has made in the past about many issues i.e. we can’t achieve it/we can’t make everyone happy so well lets just go ahead with what we want. I like most of you want to see local authority regarding budgets and spending returned to the trial courts. Like I said, I don’t have the answer, I would defer to the judges that are much more qualified than I. However, even at the fed level as you note Judge Horan, the majority still has to learn to compromise with the smaller states in order to achieve their goals. Then I think the judges will have the power they really need by getting to trust each other. I honor everything the ACJ has done and hope they continue to work on the courts being freed from the shackles of the tyrany of the AOC.
Chuck Horan
May 20, 2011
Courtflea, if you don’t want the majority to rule, and you don’t want the minority to rule, who do you want to decide? I mean, decisions have to be made, right? I believe that if two thirds of the courts by weighted average want something to be purchased out of trial court operating funds, it should happen. If not, let the AOC convince the legislature to fund the project. I mean, how else can it be done–allow a two judge court to decide the fate of the state? That small court would, of course, be immediately bought off by the AOC. I don’t think it is possible to devise a rule much fairer than that set forth in 1208. As I say, we’re willing to listen to anyone’s suggestion.
Judicial Council Watcher
May 20, 2011
Would it be fair to state that 39 out of the 58 courts must agree on committing trial court funds to statewide initiatives for all courts to be obligated to statewide initiatives?
courtflea
May 20, 2011
Judge Horan, you are right about my not having a good solution. I just think consensus building between the courts and judges should be a big part of the solution. Is that not possible? I truly believe if you get past the kiss asses, the majority of the judges would indeed support 1208. Again Judge Horan, I admire you for everything you have done for the cause. Until you guys get together, the AOC will always be able to tear you apart. And I only say this out of my love and respect for judges and the branch. PS just as a two judge court might be bought a large court could be brought to its knees by cutting off funding. So if 1208 passes as is, I Say ACJ git er done.
JCW, please don’t condem all on the above list. Many have come before us and tried and failed.
I am sorry I appear contrary. I think all of you are great, smart funny and wonderful folks. Have a great weekend.
Chuck Horan
May 21, 2011
Judicial Council Watcher:
Whether or not your solution would be fair, it is not what the statute presently says.
If you go by a straight count of courts, and use 2/3, try this: Take the smallest 2/3 of the 58 courts. Add the judges who sit in those courts. You will find that those 39 have FAR less than 50% of the judges. So, a minority of judges could decide for the majority. That’s what proportional representation tries to eliminate. Proportional representation says: Each judge in the state has an EQUAL vote. To me, that is fair, but I suppose reasonable minds can differ.
I must not be explaining this very well.
Judicial Council Watcher
May 21, 2011
You are explaining well and the implementing language now discusses this. Proportional representation generally makes sense when 27% of the states judges exist in just one county. It really doesn’t make sense to give 450 judges the same one vote in L.A. that two judges in Alpine County get but I’ve received a few emails that point out L.A.’s executive board may wish to take one direction that the majority of L.A. judges don’t support and that such a situation would be only marginally better than the status quo.
Casually observing, those small courts are over-represented in various committees, chairs and the like ( and a journalist is currently documenting this to clarify to others)
Two other rules that would be helpful might be that no one judge can simultaneously sit on more than one committee and that perhaps committee chairs should be elected amongst the committee membership and be self-determining as to what they’re commissioned to look into. as opposed to be hearded like cattle into AOC sponsored decisions.
The most important thing to consider is this: These are previously designated local funds that are already committed to the local courts that we are talking about. There really is not that many statewide programs or initiatives out there. These programs and initiatives should have legislative backing and independent legislative appropriations. Had this been the case, the legislature would have already pulled the plug themselves on CCMS.
Mrs. Kramer
May 21, 2011
Thank you, Judge Horan. You are explaining it well. Now I understand that a “court” is not a judge. A court is a county. 2/3 of the counties must give an up vote before AOC/JC could take funds from the trial courts after annual budgets are set; with each county’s vote weighted by the percentage of the state’s judges who work in each county. If there were 100 counties, the vote LA casts would represent 27 of them. Right?
I still don’t understand how the representation aspect mathematically translates into 2/3 up or down vote.
If I am understanding you correctly, in LA, if 11 out of 20 committee judges give an up vote, then this means 27% of the state’s courts/counties are tallied as giving an up vote. But in reality, it is mathematically possible that only 11 out of 450 LA judges gave an up vote and 439 gave a “no”. So that doesn’t seem right to me for the biggest courts.
In a county with only 2 judges, if one voted “yes” and the other “no”; the “no” judge’s vote carries greater weight because the “yes” judge did not achieve his 2/3 requirement. What should be tallied as neutralizing each other’s vote is weighted to the “no” vote. So that doesn’t seem right to me for the smallest courts.
To decide whether to allocate trial court funds to the AOC after budgets are set wouldn’t probably occur more that two or three times a year, right?
Why the extra layer of county representation deciding if something is up or down by weighted county? Why not give each judge one vote, no matter what county they are in and tally them all together? Would that be labor intensive to ask for votes two, maybe three times a year?
The way it is now, seems to me is an opening for AOC to keep promoting the false concept that this about big courts vs. small courts. One judge, one vote no matter where they are would eliminate that opportunity and it would give a true 2/3 tally before money goes to AOC. Right?
Thank you for taking the time to help me to understand this. I apologize if my questions are stupid. I have never run a court in my life!
Judicial Council Watcher
May 21, 2011
The language in the amendments guarantees baseline funding for each trial court so by law, the JC/AOC would not be able to cut baseline funding. I don’t think a large court could be brought to its knees as you’ve referenced because of the baseline funding provisions.
Courtflea, you mentioned “JCW, please don’t condem all on the above list. ” and I am wondering what list you’re referring to…
The only people I condemn are the crooks, the legally and ethically challenged and their cheerleaders.
SF Whistle
May 21, 2011
Is it just me–or–?
Aren’t courts all about resolution of disputes?
This discussion is taking on the dimensions of ….”How many angels can dance on the head of a pin”?…..
This seems to fast becoming an obstacle that is divisive rather than resolution oriented and causes “Courts” (not judges) to appear to have a need for a dictator…? Minimimi is prepared to fill this need…
The 1208 representation issue needs to be solved—Perhaps we should invoke the White House solution and role back the clock 44 years?
How about an emphasis placed upon “worrying about the right things”….solve the damn problem and get 1208 passed —-It happens to be 14 years late.
Delilah
May 21, 2011
I agree, SF Whistle. And no, it’s not just you.
Chuck Horan
May 21, 2011
Mrs Kramer, this will be my last shot at this question. Please, I don’t want to be rude but you must read my answers. I explained as clearly as I am able that courts are not split somehow. Courts vote through their executive committees OR if they don’t have one, by their PJ’s decision.
Take LA as an example. We elect our executive committee–all judges vote and we elect about 20 people to sit on that committee. That committee then are our REPRESENTATIVES. They vote on something. If that something wins by 51% of the Executive Committee vote, that’s all it takes. That is then the position of the LA Superior Court. Am I clear? So, under ab1208, that would count at 27% toward the necessary 2/3. Get it? It wouldn’t matter whether the Executive committee was unanimous, or 51%. See? We do NOT break courts in half. We live with the decision of our representatives. If this doesn’t get it for you, it’s the best I can do.
Chuck Horan
May 21, 2011
Why we need proportional representation: The smallest 30 counties (of the entire 58) COMBINED make up less than 8% of the judges in the state. The smallest 40 combined make up around 16%. The bulk of the judges are from about 6 counties–LA, Orange, San Diego, Santa Clara, and San Bernardino.
Those 5 alone are about 50%. The other 53 counties make up the other 1/2. The top ten largest counties make up 70% of the judges.
wendy darling
May 21, 2011
Seems pretty clear to me.
The bottom line is that currently all of the trial courts have, in reality, no meaningful representation at all. The voting members from the trial courts on the Judicial Council are all hand-selected/controlled by the Chief Justice, who then vote according to the well indoctrinated “shut up and obey” and “Speak With One Voice” requirement of the Chief Justice and the old guard of the council.
With AB 1208, the trial courts would have, at last, after 14 years of waiting and false promises, a meaningful say, by vote according to their internal governance, whether by executive committee or by the presiding judge with input from a court’s other judges, in the expenditure of their/a trial courts funding for the purposes of major infrastructure projects, programs, or expenditures (such as CCMS, or the “Phoenix” project).
In other words, the judicial council and the AOC would no longer be able to just take such funding from the trial courts, such as they have done in the past with the Trial Courts Trust Fund, and just tell the trial courts “too bad, too late, we already did it, and we know what’s best for you.” Under AB 1208, the judicial council, and the AOC, would first have to get proportional approval from the trial courts before they could use those funds, and for what projects or programs, and the justification for doing so.
Which would put an end to the council’s and the AOC’s current practice of feigning “forgiveness” after the fact instead of asking for permission or approval beforehand.
And that, after all, is exactly why the State legislature directed the Judicial Council and the AOC 14 years ago to put a Trial Court Bill of Rights in place. And it also exactly why Ron George, the current Chief Justice, the Judicial Council, Vickrey, and the AOC, intentionally never honored that obligation, purposefully worked against it, and are fighting so hard against now having it taken care of by the State legislature and AB 1208.
Simply put, they don’t want the trial courts to have any right of input at all – whether proportional or anything else.
Long live the ACJ.
Mrs. Kramer
May 21, 2011
Judge Horan,
I don’t think the courts are split. I have looked at the raw numbers that are available. It appears to me that the AOC/JC proponents falsely project the concept that the courts are split, not the judges themselves.
I understand what you are saying. I just don’t understand the why. With that said, it is not important that I, personally, understand the why. What is important is that AB1208 becomes law so that funding will be adequate to run the courts; not to be squandered to overpay unlicensed contractors, continue to waste dollars on an inoperable computer system, etc.
Mrs. Kramer
May 21, 2011
Judge Horan,
I think I understand what you are trying to tell me of why AB1208 must be done by representative vote per county, instead of one judge, one vote state wide. Its because each county has designated judges who know their own budgets and how monies are allocated in detail. If you then went back and said each judge could have a vote that potentially impacts that budget, they would be making a decision without the required superior knowledge of those who have been chosen to oversee the court’s monies.
I think you are trying to tell me that if you are going to elect someone to oversee a county’s budget, then they need to be able to make all final decisions impacting that budget on behalf of those they have been elected to represent; which would mean AB1208 must be done by representative vote. Is that right?
JusticeCalifornia
May 22, 2011
I am not participating in the 1208 specific language discussion.
However, from a practical perspective, it makes no sense at all for a small group of cj appointees (some of whom are indisputably ethically challenged), to make decisions for the 1,700 or so elected judges in this state. Under this model, our very inexperienced cj and her select current favorite appointees claim the power to make branch decisions and set branch policies and priorities, notwithstanding what the branch’s 1,700 elected judges think — or what the public that elected these judges think– and even over the vehement express objections of judges, the public, the legislature and state auditors.
The “largest judiciary in the western world” has hit rock bottom under this patently ridiculous model. For years top leadership has been making financially and ethically disastrous decisions while playing the “lalalalala I can’t hear you” game. As a result, the branch is the subject of loud, public, internal and external, concern, disrespect and suspicion — all of which are well-deserved.
The ACJ has proposed an alternative and taken massive steps to make change possible.
In all fairness, proponents of change cannot collaborate with a moving target that voices concern about the status quo and concern about the proposed change but no alternatives. If judges are concerned about the specifics of the 1208 language, they should speak up and articulate their concerns, AND suggest alternative language. Quickly.
There is no going back. It is quite likely that virtually every judge in this state who is paying attention knows that a) top leadership has made terrible decisions that have harmed the branch in all ways; b) the status quo is neither viable nor sustainable; c) the new cj is neither an experienced administrator nor an effective consensus builder; d) top leadership is riddled with certain well-known known corrupt players; and e) change is inevitable.
The public trust and confidence in the branch appears to be at an all-time low under current top leadership.
Judges have a duty to act during times just such as these. The Code of Judicial Ethics states: “An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.”
At this point moving the branch forward in a positive manner will almost certainly involve opposing top leadership.
So be it.
The Code of Judicial Ethics observes that “Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depend in turn upon their acting without fear or favor.”
Mrs. Kramer
May 24, 2011
Hearing Date 5.27.11
CURRENT BILL STATUS
MEASURE : A.B. No. 1208
AUTHOR(S) : Charles Calderon.
TOPIC : Trial courts: administration.
HOUSE LOCATION : ASM
+LAST AMENDED DATE : 05/18/2011
TYPE OF BILL :
Active
Non-Urgency
Non-Appropriations
Majority Vote Required
Non-State-Mandated Local Program
Fiscal
Non-Tax Levy
LAST HIST. ACT. DATE: 05/19/2011
LAST HIST. ACTION : Re-referred to Com. on APPR.
COMM. LOCATION : ASM APPROPRIATIONS
HEARING DATE : 05/27/2011
TITLE : An act to amend Sections 68085, 68502.5, 77006.5, 77009,
77200, 77202, 77203, 77206, and 77207 of the Government
Code, relating to courts.
JusticeCalifornia
May 24, 2011
Tomorrow and Thursday. Time to call and e-mail the Assembly Committee on Appropriations in favor of 1208. The contact information is above.
I purposefully have stayed out of the 1208 language discussions. I have not seen any proposed alternative language from stakeholders. Therefore, I will be supporting the bill as is.
I hope judges are reaching across the aisle, and trusting that they will be able to better serve the public and rebuild the trust, confidence and respect in the branch than those currently at the helm. AB 1208 is the first step in giving trial court judges back their voices. The next step is to clean up and get proper representation on the judicial council ( at least 8 appointments must be made next month, right?), so the branch can operate as an informed, intelligent, effective, independent but basically cohesive whole. Perhaps not speaking with one voice, but at least speaking the same language.
JusticeCalifornia
May 25, 2011
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_1201-1250/ab_1208_bill_20110518_amended_asm_v97.html
Confirming that this is where all can find the the full text and any new developments. . . .right?
No new leg analysis yet– presumably they are going to wait until right before the hearing again?
JusticeCalifornia
May 25, 2011
Actually, here is the general info link, where you can type in “AB 1208” and search
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html
Judicial Council Watcher
May 25, 2011
I’m unsure if appropriations provides its own legislative analysis… that’s a good question.
One Who Knows
May 25, 2011
Yes, the Appropriations Committee will do an analysis of the bill but it will focus on the fiscal impact of the bill on the state general fund and not really on the policy. All of the legislative committees release their analyses either the day of the hearing or the night before. Nothing nefarious with this timing with regard to AB 1208 this timing for all bills has to do with workload for the committee staff.